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By law, the British government seals all cabinet and other important government 
documents until after thirty years passes. In 2012, the “thirty-year rule” expired for all 
documents pertaining to the Falklands War of 1982.  There is already an enormous 
amount of material written about the war but these released documents provide new 
insight. Lasting only one hundred days, the war was kicked off when Argentina invaded 
the Falkland Islands, or known in Argentina as las Malvinas, on 2 April 1982.  Located in 
the very South Atlantic and four hundred miles east of Argentina, the British launched 
their largest naval task force since World War II to recover their colony. By 14 June 
1982, the islands were back in British possession. Relying heavily on these new 
documents, this thesis analyzes the controversial sinking of the ARA General Belgrano.  
This examination demonstrates the British fear of the Argentine navy and the potentially 
catastrophic damage it could have inflicted on not only the two British carriers, the HMS 
Hermes and HMS Invincible, but also on the overall British campaign. The documents 
also highlight the British government’s efforts to control the media, albeit not all efforts 
were successful. This section relies heavily on the government documents but also 
journalistic accounts, British commander biographies, and newspapers written during the 
war and years later.  Allowing the government documents to speak for themselves, this 
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This is the story of a freak of history, almost certainly the last colonial war that Britain 
will ever fight. So extraordinary an event was it that, even after men began to die, many 
of those taking part felt as if they had been swept away into fantasy, that the ships sinking 




- Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins 
Major-General Jeremy Moore of the Royal Marines woke up to a disturbing 
telephone call at 03:00 on 2 April 1982. The caller informed his staffer that the 
Argentines were in the midst of invading the Falkland Islands. In total disbelief, Moore 
demanded to be assured that this call was not a belated April Fool’s joke.
2
  By the time he 
reached his headquarters, the British government had already determined to deploy a task 
force to be sent to the South Atlantic.  The Argentine invasion of the British colony 
triggered the largest British naval response since the Second World War. Located 400 
miles east of the coast of Argentina in the very south of the Atlantic, the Falkland Islands 
are essentially rock covered in moss and sheep, and dominated by the cold Antarctic 
weather. They hold no real strategic or tactical advantage for either Argentina or Great 
Britain. Originally a whaling station and port, the islands have been a source of political 
tension between the Argentines and the British since 1765. However, the political dispute 
quickly escalated on 2 January 1833 when Captain John Onslow took possession of the 
islands on behalf of Britain.  Argentine Captain Don Jose Maria Pinedo had already laid 
claim to the islands but Onslow’s military might forced the Argentines off the islands. 
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 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York, W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1983), vii 
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Thereafter, the British claimed sovereignty and placed the islands under British control; 
they were subsequently settled by Britons. However, this situation was never accepted by 
Argentina. The sovereignty dispute was brought to the United Nations after the Second 
World War and there were numerous, albeit failed, diplomatic attempts for a peaceful 
solution in the 1970’s between the two countries.
3
  By this time, both countries suffered 
from internal economic and political difficulties. Ironically, the Falkland Islands provided 
a distraction for both British and Argentine citizens as patriotic sentiments were 
heightened throughout the two countries as result of the invasion. 
The islands are located 8,000 miles from Britain and it took the British Task Force 
over three weeks to reach the area. Aerial combat began on 1 May and British forces 
landed on East Falkland on 21 May. By 14 June 1982, the British had recaptured Port 
Stanley, the capital of the Falklands. The war lasted only one hundred days but it resulted 
in the deaths of 253 British men: 85 from the Royal Navy, 26 from the Royal Marines, 
123 Army, 1 Royal Air Force, and 18 British civilians deployed with the Task Force.
4
 
775 British troops were wounded, while 115 were prisoners of war (POWs). The Royal 
Navy suffered heavily, losing 2 destroyers (HMS Coventry and Sheffield), 2 frigates 
(HMS Ardent and Antelope), 1 landing ship logistics (Sir Galahad), 1 landing craft utility 
                                                 
3
 For the best overview of the political negotiations and disputes leading up the 1982 invasion, 
see Max Hastings, and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falklands. (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1983) 
4
 Sir Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2005), 772-774 and Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs 




(LCU F4) and 1 container ship (Atlantic Conveyor). Argentine losses included 655 dead 
and a staggering 11,848 POWs.
5
  
The historiography of the Falklands War is extensive. The political issues that have 
been considered include the effects of the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, the debates over de-
colonization after World War II, Argentina’s transformation into a military dictatorship in 
1976, Thatcherism, American perception and involvement, the power of the United 
Nations, and post-war diplomatic and political lessons. Since the Soviets and the 
Americans were not directly involved, this war also prompted historians to look further 
into these types of marginal conflicts. Generally, the Falklands War is seen as a Cold War 
anomaly: a peripheral war involving a first world power and a third world country.  
In terms of military significance, the Falklands War was the first to demonstrate the 
capabilities of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN).  Military historians have also focused 
on the use of helicopters, the continuing advancement of field medicine and mobile 
hospitals, and the unimaginable 8,000 mile logistical system. The landing of British 
troops on East Falkland also prompted historians to continue examining maneuver 
warfare and landing doctrine.  Naval and aerial aspects of the war are given a significant 
amount of attention by military historians. Debates and questions remain: did the British 
achieve command of the air? Command of the sea? What is command of the air and the 
sea? Does the definition change with different types of conflict? This thesis will examine 
some of these questions.  
                                                 
5
 Martin Middlebrook, Argentine Fight for the Falklands. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 




While providing an outline, Chapter II traces the chronology of the war while 
simultaneously examining the broader historical issues. Admittedly, this chapter does not 
cover every political, diplomatic or military event; it focuses on the areas of heavy debate 
surrounding the war, largely between March 1982 and June 1982. The study includes 
contributing factors leading to the war including the political situations in Great Britain 
and Argentina, the South Georgia Island invasion, and the failure of British intelligence 
to predict the invasion. It examines the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the British 
diplomatic and military response, the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano, British 
command of the air and sea, and British repossession of the islands. Finally, it includes a 
discussion of current debates surrounding the war and relations of the British government 
and military with British and American journalists. It also includes a general analysis of 
American, British and South American historiographies.   
Chapter III examines the most controversial aspect of the Falklands War: the 
sinking of the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano by a British SSN. The British 
decision to sink the cruiser outside the established total exclusion zone (TEZ) generated 
heavy criticism from international actors but also politicians and citizens within Britain. 
The controversy grew into conspiracy when allegations were made in the House of 
Commons that the Thatcher government, in spite of a peace deal on the table, deliberately 
ordered the sinking. These allegations charged the Thatcher government with 
unnecessarily escalating the war. However, recently released government documents 




campaign to recover the islands.  This chapter uses the documents, recent biographies and 
other recent details to justify the British decision to sink the Belgrano.  
Chapter IV also uses recently released documents to analyze the British 
assessment of potential foreign assistance and potential for foreign intervention.  While a 
substantial amount of attention is given to the Cold War superpowers, the Americans and 
the Soviets, the British also examined the majority of Latin and South American 
countries and their potential for involvement. The documents also highlight the British 
attempts at controlling the media throughout the campaign. Although the media 
contributed to the rise in patriotism during the war, they also proved to be another thorn 
in the British military’s and government’s sides. This chapter examines many situations 
where British media contributed to Argentine intelligence by broadcasting sensitive 
information and in some cases, blatantly reported details that jeopardized the lives of 
servicemen. American newspapers are also used in the chapter; despite not being directly 
involved in the war, the Americans portrayed many instances of clashing between the 
British government and media.  
This thesis uses the documents released following the expiration of “the thirty 
year rule.” Using newspaper articles, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 
and autobiographies to bridge any gaps in material, this thesis allows the documents to 












THE FALKLANDS WAR: 
A TIMELINE OF MAJOR HISTORIGRAPHICAL ISSUES 
 
When you stop a dictator there are always risks but there are great risks in not stopping 




- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher  
  




- Argentine Junta Dictator General Leopoldo Galtieri 
 
The 1970’s saw change in governments for both the Great Britain and Argentina. In 
1976, Isabel Peron was deposed from the Argentine Presidency and was succeeded by a 
group of military officers simply called “the Junta,” with General Jorge Rafael Videla 
serving as the President.
8
  Videla left office in March 1981 and Army Commander-in-
Chief General Leopoldo Galtieri rose to the Presidency in December 1981. The 
Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, won the 1979 election in Britain. The 
Conservatives did not view the South Atlantic as the main defense concern for their 
country; that continued to be the Soviet threat to Western Europe.
9
  By 1982, only 1,813 
                                                 
6
Glyn Mathais. Interview with Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher: Interview for ITN on the Falklands. 
ITN, 5 April 1982  
7
 General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri responding to a warning from US Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig about the consequences of the invasion. 10 April 1982. Quoted in Alexander 
Haig, Caveat (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 280 as cited in Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of 
Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 57  
8
 Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Secker & Warburg, 
1984), 15 
9
 Michael D. Kandiah, “Elite Oral History and the Global Implications Of the Falklands Conflict: 
British Perspectives” (paper was presented at the International Oral History Conference, Rome, 
Italy, 23-26 June 2004) as presented in “The Falklands War”, seminar held 5 June 2002 (Centre 




inhabitants lived on the islands.
 10
   Due to the economic recession, Parliament 
continuously debated on whether to minimize or terminate funding for defense for the 
islands. Needless to say, the Falkland Islands were insignificant in the grand scheme of 
British political affairs. However, this all changed when Argentina surprised the British 
by invading on 2 April 1982.  The Falklands were so insignificant that even the then 
British Secretary of State for Defence John Nott conceded to having trouble identifying 
the islands’ location on a map before the conflict.
11
   Nevertheless, the British responded 
by sending their navy south to the Falkland Islands, resulting in the largest British naval 
engagement since World War II.   
The Junta, frustrated with British delay in transfer of sovereignty negotiations, had 
faced severe internal political issues with a rapidly declining economy entailing an 
inflation rate over 100 percent, staggering unemployment rates, and falling wages.
12
  
Seeking a diversion, General Leopoldo Galtieri, the Junta’s dictator, needed an outside 
conflict to deflect public criticism of the government. Las Malvinas (the Argentine name 
of the islands) provided this distraction.  This was not surprising; since 6 March 1957, las 
Malvinas, through formal decree, had been declared part of Argentine territory. This 
same decree even proclaimed the islands’ inhabitants as Argentine citizens.
13
 Karl von 
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 1980 census figures cited in Gordon Smith, Battle Atlas of the Falklands War (Denarth: Naval-
History.Net, 2006), 11 
11
 John Nott, “The Falklands War,” seminar held 5 June 2002 (Centre for Contemporary British 
History, 2005 , http://www.icbh.ac.uk/witness/falklands/), 18 
12
 Arthur Gavshon and Barnett, Roger W., eds. Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis Naval Institute 
Press, 1989), 14-18 as cited in LCDR Edward B. Zellem., “Clausewitz and Sea Power: Lessons of 
the Falkland Islands  War.” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama Air Command and Staff College Air 
University, March 1999),  24 
13
 Peter Calvert, The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs, (London: Frances Pinter 




Clausewitz asserts in On War, in what probably his best known argument, that war is a 
continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.
14
 The decision to 
invade Malvinas provided the opportunity to divert internal political conflict and 
legitimize the Junta with a common cause. In essence, this was continuing politics 
through other means.  It is also suggested that this invasion was intended to signal to 
Chile that Argentina was prepared to back up not only its claims to las Malvinas, but also 
other territorial claims, including the Beagle Channel, with force.
15
  In 1980, Pope John 
Paul II mediated Chilean and Argentine claims to the Beagle Channel and eventually 
ruled in Chile’s favor. Admiral Jorge Anaya, overall commander of the navy, the 
extremely hawkish arm of the Argentine military, believed that control of the Cape Horn 
area could be established after control of the Falklands was achieved. 
16
 The Argentine 
Junta also argued that Argentina’s military operation was to “recover” the islands, not to 
invade; a draft plan prepared for the “recovery” of Argentine territory had existed in 
Argentine naval headquarters since 1960s.
17
 The military operation was to serve the 
political goal of sparking negotiations for transfer of sovereignty.
18
   
                                                 
14
 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 605 
15
Peter Beck, The Falkland Islands as an International Problem (London: Routledge, 1988) 73,  
as cited in LCDR Edward B. Zellem,“Clausewitz and Sea Power: Lessons of the Falkland Islands 
War,” 24 
16
 Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: The Full Story, (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1982), 27 
17
 Ironically, it was prepared by then Captain Jorge Anaya. Hastings and Jenkins, 31 
18
 Major Rodolfo Pereyra, "Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands Air War," Air & Space Power 

































Due to defense budget cuts, the icebreaker HMS Endurance, last British naval 
ship in the area, was to be pulled from the South Atlantic at the end of its 1981-1982 tour.  
An essential link between the Falkland Islands and South Georgia Island, another British 
claim, east of the Falklands, the Endurance was to be paid off and sold or scrapped after 
the conclusion of her final patrol.  The ship’s “premature retirement” was supposed to 
save the Ministry of Defense about £3 million a year.
19
 This withdrawal announcement 
was indeed public, even with Thatcher later describing Endurance as “a military 
irrelevance,” suggesting that, “that it would neither deter nor repel an invasion.”
20
  While 
it lacked military capabilities, it was not the “toothless tiger” it was made out to be. 
Along with its’ excellent communication facilities, it was able to carry twenty or so 
Royal Marines, launch two Wasp helicopters carrying air to surface missiles, and use her 
two twenty millimeter cannons.
21
  The plan to withdraw the Endurance triggered two 
reactions. First, the Falkland Islanders believed the British government was abandoning 
them. Second, it signaled to the Argentines that British influence and desire to remain in 
the region was waning.  
The invasion of the Falkland Islands was two-fold. The conflict kicked off 
preemptively on 19 March 1982 when approximately thirty Argentine metal salvagers, 
led by Argentine businessman, Constantino Davidoff, illegally landed on South Georgia 
                                                 
19
 Keith Speed, Sea Change: The Battle for the Falklands and the Future of Britain’s Navy (Bath: 
Ashgrove Press Ltd, 1982), 111 
20
 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pg. 177 cited in Sir Lawrence Freedman, The Official 
History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. I, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 224 
21




Island and raised the Argentine flag.
 22
 Argentina sent one hundred troops to defend the 
salvagers after the British responded by sending the icebreaker HMS Endurance to South 
Georgia.  Whether the Junta planned to include South Georgia in their invasion plans 
remains a matter of debate. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign cites several 
different sources that suggest the Junta did not initially plan the South Georgia invasion 
but it intended “to take advantage to press her claim, and that if any Argentine workmen 
resisting British attempts to move them were killed, a force would then be landed on the 
Falkland Islands.”
23
 However, some sources argue that an Argentine naval special forces 
unit infiltrated Davidoff’s ship, posing as scientists.
24
 This stems from the reported 
September 1981 Argentina plan “Operation Alpha,” in which the Argentine navy would 
use Davidoff’s business in South Georgia as a way to establish another base on the 
disputed territory.
25
 Several former British commanders argue the Argentines were 
caught off guard by the metal salvagers and forced to invade the Falkland Islands earlier 
than intended. Nevertheless, by taking South Georgia, the Junta was forced to move their 
Falkland Islands invasion plans up to April from September, fearing the British increase 
in naval forces in the region.  
 
 
                                                 
22
 The South Georgia Islands and the South Sandwich Island chain lay 900 miles east of the 
Falklands.  While they are a British overseas territory, the Argentines also claim sovereignty over 
the islands. 
23
 Freedman, Vol. I, 220 
24
 Nick van de Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, (London: Leo Cooper, 1998), 8 as reported in 
Freedman, Vol. I, 236 
25
 In 1976, the Argentines landed on South Thule, another island in the South Sandwich chain, 
and built a small military base. The matter was never settled between Argentina and the British 



























The South Georgia Island “incident”, as it is often referred to in British sources, 
perplexed the British government: was this a precursor for a Falkland Islands invasion or 
was this a minor diplomatic dispute? To add to the uncertainty, the annual Argentine 
naval exercises with Uruguay, already announced by Buenos Aires and Montevideo, 
caused even more confusion amongst the British.  Prior to 31 March, the British did not 
posses any firm evidence of the Argentine intention to invade the Falklands.
26
 However, 
by Saturday, 1 April 1982, the Argentine missile corvettes Drummond and Granville 
broke away from Uruguayan maneuvers and sailed south to join the Bahia Paraiso group 
farther south. 
27
 By then, it was far too late for the British to block the Argentine fleet’s 




The actual invasion of the Falkland Islands, dubbed Operation ROSARIO, 
centered at the capital of Port Stanley, was highly anti-climactic. The British garrison was 
overwhelmed as it consisted of only two British Marine detachments, a total of 81 men, 
alongside what was supposed to be a territorial defense force of 120 to defend the islands. 
In fact only 23 showed up.
29
 The Argentine landing force arrived at 04:30 AM and 
captured the Governor, who then ordered surrender of the British garrison. The 
Argentines had captured the Falklands by 08:30AM on 2 April.  Unable to contain their 
                                                 
26
 Freedman, Vol. I,  216 
27
 Hastings and Jenkins, 60 
28
 Ibid, 72 
29
 Usually there was only one detachment on the Falklands; however at the time of the invasion, 
there happened to be two detachments due to a scheduled rotation. The two detachments therefore 
consisted of 69 Royal Marines, 11 Royal Navy personnel from the HMS Endurance and one ex-
Royal Marine then living on the Falklands who re-enlisted. See Sir Lawrence Freedman, The 




delight, the Junta announced the “recovery” of las Malvinas two hours before formal 
surrender.
30
 In attempts to maintain good relations with the islanders and start political 
negotiations with the British, the Argentine rules of engagement (ROE) mandated for the 
occupation to be carried out without inflicting casualties and property destruction on the 
British soldiers and the islanders.  
On 24 January 1982, the influential columnist Jesús Iglesias Ruoca, writing in 
Argentina’s leading paper, La Prensa, argued that “as far as the U.K. is concerned, there 
might be a freezing of relations for a while, but in the context of Western strategic 
interests it seems improbable that the situation would be prolonged.” 
31
 He described the 
time for invasion as opportune for the recovery of the Malvinas, citing the presence of 
less than 80 armed men in Port Stanley. Despite Ruoca’s prophecy, the Argentine 
invasion of the Falklands caught the British intelligence and political community by 
surprise. Numbed by constant threats of invasion since the 1960’s, the British had simply 
grown accustomed to ignoring the Argentine rhetoric. Even when answering the House of 
Commons as to why Argentines were able to invade successfully, Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher declared “it would have been absurd to dispatch the fleet every time 
there was bellicose talk in Buenos Aires.”
32
 
                                                 
30
 Hastings and Jenkins, 75 
31
 Sunday Times Insight Team, 25 
32
 Hastings and Jenkins, 78. Thatcher and the British government did not, however, take into 
account that this was the approaching sesquicentennial anniversary of the British occupation of 
the islands.  This certainly was another motivator for the Argentines. See Welch, David A. 
"Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War." International Journal. no. 




Although the Argentines succeeded in conquering the islands relatively easily, 
and despite the fact that they knew the British would eventually respond, they did nothing 
to take advantage of their surprise.  For example, they did not control or sever 
communication lines between the islanders, a mistake soon made evident during the 
British counter-invasion. In another instance, the runway at Port Stanley was too short for 
many Argentine air force jets to land safely.  Measuring 4,100 feet, the runway was just 
barely long enough for the Super Etendard to land. However, this landing had a very 
“small safety margin” when the runway was dry; when it was wet, landings would be 
impossible.
33
 While they did build a system of lighting around the runway and taxiways, 
the Argentines did little to lengthen the runway. Even in the month before the British 
Task Force arrived in the South Atlantic, the Argentines had only managed to begin 
extending the runway.
34
 According to Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, this wasn’t 
because of logistical issues. Instead, the issue was morale on the ground as they quote a 
soldier of the 7
th
 Argentine Regiment saying that “until 1
st
 of May [when the British 
bombed the runway at Port Stanley], no one had really believed that we were going to 
fight.”
35
 The Argentines’ passive conduct of the campaign suggested that “when 
confronted with the devastating shock of a British military response that they had never 
reckoned with, they pinned all of their hopes upon holding their ground and seeking 
diplomatic, rather than military, deliverance.”
36
 
                                                 
33
 Jeffery Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1983), 28 
34
 Army engineers had laid down steel plating to extend the runway by 200 feet. Ibid, 30.  
35
  Hastings and Jenkins, 286 
36




The theory that war is a continuation of politics by other means also applies to the 
British reaction to the invasion. Not only was British sovereignty at stake with this 
invasion but the British were worried that allowing the Argentines to seize the Falklands 
as they did would establish a precedent for other governments who wanted to “reclaim” 
British territory by force. Politically, to dissuade and discourage other nations from using 
armed invasions to achieve political solutions, the British also sought and received the 
United Nations Security Council condemnation of the Argentine invasion with the 
passing of Resolution 502.   Adopted by the Security Council on 3 April, the resolution 
demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and a complete withdrawal by Argentine 
Forces. It called for a diplomatic solution to the situation and it allowed the United 
Kingdom to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which allowed the British 
to claim the right of self-defense.  As Gavshon and Rice argue, the British government 
now “had carte blanch to deal with Argentina, in the same way as a police force has carte 
blanche to deal with an armed man holding hostages in a stolen car.”
37
  The British froze 
Argentine assets, banned imports and suspended export credit and it was not long before 
the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC) joined in these 
measures. 
38
 Further political and diplomatic negotiations through the Americans, 
Peruvians and other mediators were exhausted before the British used force.  Charles 
Koburger Jr. sums up the British strategy in three steps: (1) diplomacy through the United 
Nations, (2) economic sanctions through the EEC and, (3) force, or blockade, with the 
                                                 
37
 Gavshon and Rice, 37 
38
 The Americans waited to impose sanctions until after the Alexander Haig negotiations 
concluded. Realizing he was dealing with “a regime quite unable to take coherent decisions, let 




option of a landing if necessary. 
39
 Clausewitz theory holds true in this analysis: the 
British threat of the use of force was a continuation of politics through other means. 
Despite the failure to the heed warning signs for the invasion, the British still 
heeded a vital Mahanian precept:  “the influence of the government will be felt in its most 
legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy.” 
40
 The submarine HMS Conqueror 
and Britain’s two aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible set on out 5 April 
while the rest of the surface Task Force was on its way between 7- 9 April. The British 
Task Force Fleet (CTF 137) fell under command of then Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, 
a former submarine commander. Woodward was given command of the Task Force 
largely due to the fact that he was already with the majority of the British fleet in the 
Gibraltar area, which was participating in the annual spring naval exercises. Also, since 
he had served as assistant director of naval planning in the British Ministry of Defence, 
he was aware of the contingency plans to recapture the islands if invaded.
41
  Thus, the 
British were quickly able to launch Operation CORPORATE in response to the Argentine 
invasion.  
While some ships departed from Great Britain and others from the Mediterranean 
area, the entire British fleet sailed toward Ascension Island, a tiny volcanic rock 
formation between Brazil and Africa. The fleet convened there to re-supply and organize 
before heading south on 16 April.  The British government had already announced the 
                                                 
39
 Charles Koburger, Jr. Sea Power in the Falklands, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 35 
40
 Captain A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1894), 82 
41
 This commander was Admiral Sandy Woodward.  See Adm Sandy Woodward, One Hundred 
Days (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1992), 88, 89 as cited in Major Rodolfo Pereyra, "Clausewitz 




establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) on 12 April. The circular zone was 
centered on the Falklands and had a radius of 200 miles. Maintaining the same shape and 
size, this zone evolved into the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) on 30 April. Any Argentine 
warship or naval auxiliaries entering the MEZ could have been fired upon without 
warning while any Argentine sea vessel, including military and civil, or aircraft entering 
the TEZ was potentially subject to unannounced attack.  Any foreign vessel or aircraft 
entering the TEZ without permission from the British government was also subject to 
attack. The MEZ was patrolled and enforced by British nuclear-powered submarines 
(SSN) until the Task Force arrived and they were still used to enforce the TEZ. While the 
MEZ and TEZ were not intended to strain the mainland Argentine economy directly, they 
were designed to interfere with Argentine naval movements as well as to starve the 
Argentine garrison on the Falklands.  The British used the MEZ and TEZ to achieve 
command of the sea. 
Unfortunately for the commanders, the British government had not made its 
intentions clear nor had it decided on a course to settle the dispute. Some politicians 
advocated a landing on West Falkland (a relatively uninhabited part of the Falkland 
Islands) so as to make a statement to Argentine dictator General Galtieri. However, 
Margaret Thatcher argued that the Argentines “need to be pushed off,” and advocated for 
planning that secured the recapture of Port Stanley on East Falkland. 
42
 On 25 April, a 
detachment of the 3
rd
 Commando Brigade, along with HMS Endurance, recaptured South 
Georgia Island, subsequently sinking one of Argentina’s three submarines, the Santa 
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  The submarine was sunk by an air-to-surface anti ship missile launched from a 
British helicopter. The missile severely damaged the submarine, forcing the Argentine 
crew to abandon her when she started listing.  The raid on South Georgia again echoed 
Clausewitz: the British government needed the bite of military action to convey a strong 
threat of force. On 1 May 1982, with the British fleet entering the TEZ, the British air 
force conducted raids on Port Stanley, targeting the airfield. While the runway was never 
put out of commission, the Argentines did little to protect and improve it nonetheless. 
The war in the Falklands was now underway.  
The most controversial incident of the war occurred on 2 May when Admiral 
Woodward ordered the sinking of the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The 
cruiser and her accompanying destroyers were located on the southwestern side of the 
TEZ, moving westward.  With the Argentine carrier group, including the carrier 25th of 
May, on the northern side of the TEZ, Woodward interpreted the Belgrano to be part of a 
pincer movement.  There were two issues: the Belgrano was located outside the TEZ and 
thus fell outside of the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and her movements indicated the 
cruiser group was heading toward the Argentine coast, not the British fleet. However, as 
the British fleet only maintained two aircraft carriers; any damage to, or worse, the 
sinking of either one, would cripple and potentially end the British effort to recover the 
Falklands. Woodward concluded that “whether she is inside or outside the TEZ is 









irrelevant. She will have to go.”
44
  When Woodward ordered the Conqueror to sink the 
Belgrano, the order was immediately denied and sent straight to London because it 
blatantly violated the ROE.
 45
 Woodward maintains his order was intended to prompt 
London to change the ROE and allow the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano as soon as 
possible.  Panic and consternation ensued in London when the signal reached 
Commander-in-Chief Sir John Fieldhouse and Admiral Terence Lewin. However, the 
message was received: Woodward needed the ROE changed and fast.   
After a change in the ROE was issued from London, which allowed for the 
sinking of enemy ships outside the TEZ, the SSN HMS Conqueror was ordered to sink 
the ARA General Belgrano.
46
 After the ship was hit, some of the Belgrano’s 
accompanying escorts gave chase to the Conqueror, while other ships such as the 
destroyer Bouchard did not know what had happened, adding that “we did not observe 
any explosions.”
47
 Only recently has it emerged that the Argentine command learned of 
the sinking at midnight.
48
 Sadly, this resulted in a delay for the search and rescue of 
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survivors, only exacerbating the disaster. In total, 321 Argentine men lost their lives.
49
 
The consequences for the Argentines were much greater than just the lives lost. Admiral 
Anaya, the hawk of the Argentine Junta, was keen on using his carriers after the sinking 
of the Belgrano but because their fleet was deemed too much of a national asset to risk, 
he was held back by his Junta colleagues.
 50
 It was now evident that the Junta was not as 
unified as before. A single sinking by a British SSN sent the Argentine navy home for 
good as the British fleet never saw any of the large Argentine warships again.  With the 
Junta’s credibility severely damaged, the British SSNs were able to patrol the seas of the 
South Atlantic, virtually unopposed.  
The sinking of the Belgrano erupted into controversy on 21 December 1982 when 
Labour Party MP Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow) alleged that Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and her Conservative government “coldly and deliberately gave the orders to 
sink the Belgrano, in the knowledge that an honorable peace was on offer and in the 
expectation--- all too justified—that the Conqueror’s torpedoes would torpedo the peace 
negotiations.” 
51
  Mr. Dalyell was referring to the peace initiative the Peruvians had tried 
to push forward between 1 and 2 May. Since the Belgrano was sunk on 2 May, the timing 
of the situation suggested to many critics that the British chose to escalate the war 
deliberately.  However, due to time zone changes and communication issues, questions 
remained as to whether the British government was aware of the peace plan.  The 
controversy only continued to grow as “government versions of the sinking have been 
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inconsistent both in the factual details and in the military and political reasoning put 
forward.”
52
 The debate over the known intelligence and justification of the sinking 
continues today.  
However, the Junta did attempt to save face. On 4 May, in retaliation for the 
Belgrano sinking, the Argentine Fleet Air Arm Command ordered two Super Etendards, 
armed with Exocet missiles, to attack the British Task Force. Largely due to deteriorating 
weather conditions, no Argentine aircraft came within 200 nautical miles (nm) of the 
British Task force between 2 and 3 May. To conduct further air raids on the islands, the 
British Task Force maneuvered within located 40-55nm south-east of the Falklands.
53
 
Three Type 42 destroyers were occupying air defense stations some 18nm west in front 
of the main body of the task force: the HMS Glasgow, the HMS Sheffield and the HMS 
Coventry.  Unfortunately, the Task Force was without Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 
upgrades due to the 1981 navy cuts, and the new Nimrod 3 AEW aircraft were not due to 
enter service until 1983.
54
  The two Super Etendards were able to avoid outdated British 
radar and launch two Exocet missiles. A single Exocet hit the Sheffield on the starboard 
side, killing 20 men and injuring 26.  
The loss of the Sheffield shocked both the military and London: the Sheffield was 
the first British ship loss by direct hostile action since the Second World War.  The Junta 
was able to restore faith in campaign back at home, diverting attention from the Belgrano 
sinking; however it would be short lived. For the British, the Sheffield sinking forced the 
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country and government to realize the seriousness of the situation and the meaning of the 
war.
55
 The sinking of the Sheffield served as a reminder that in the nuclear age, a third 
world country was still able to inflict damage on a first world military. 
56
 The Task Force 
was lucky: the Super Etendards were originally intended to find and attack either one of 
the British aircraft carriers, the HMS Hermes or Invincible. The Argentines had control of 
the early warning and fighter control radars at Port Stanley.  These radars provided 
information on positions of patrolling Sea Harriers and tracked aircraft moving to and 
from the carriers, giving an indication of the whereabouts of the Task Group.
57
 However, 
poor combat tactics and lack of training hampered the Argentine air force. Instead of 
properly identifying the Type 42 frigates for what they were, the Argentine pilots simply 
fired upon the first ships they spotted.  Throughout the course of the war, the Argentine 
air force developed a reputation for this; it was notorious for firing on the first ship 
detected.  
The Falklands presented a common, but difficult situation for both the Argentine 
and British fleets. The Argentine air force mainland base was over 450 miles away from 
the islands, while the British carriers provided the only means to launch British air 
strikes. Therefore, the military historiographical issues pertaining to the Falklands War 
focus on the British command of the sea and air. This is not unexpected especially given 
the distance the British fleet had to travel to project power.  As argued by Charles 
Koburger Jr. in Sea Power in the Falklands, sea power’s form has continued to adjust to 
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new weapons and tactics; however, the command of the sea is the most important fact for 
a navy.  Sea power, however gained and exercised, is defined as the ability to use the sea 
as one likes, and to deny the use of the sea to the enemy.
58
  While he argues that overall 
command of the sea was not achieved by the British, Koburger further suggests that the 
proper application of tools—whatever tools, whether the tools are above, on, or below the 
surface—to accomplish command is sea power.  This conflict was the first to utilize 
nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) and they became the favorite tool of the British navy. 
As demonstrated above, the sinking of the General Belgrano by the HMS Conqueror had 
a profound effect on the Argentine navy.  SSNs patrolled off the Argentine coast to ward 
off any potential ships and to pick up any radar signals transmitted by the Argentines.  
The Argentine navy possessed only three conventional submarines prior to the start of the 
conflict but besides the Santa Fe at South Georgia, they never significantly contributed to 
the Argentine campaign.  The Santa Fe was sunk on 25
 
April, the San Luis was in service 
until 17 May and the Salta was never detected near the Falklands.  Due to the numbers of 
British ships lost, politicians and public interpretation often view the British attempts to 
command the sea as failure. However, digressing from Koburger’s assessment, the 
British did maintain command of the sea: the carriers were never threatened after the 
Belgrano sinking as the Argentine navy remained close to home throughout the 
remainder of the war.  
The command of the sea and air are intertwined in naval wars. However, the 
historiography regarding the British command of the air is much more critical than it is of 
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the command of the sea. A frequent argument is that because the Royal Navy never 
gained superiority in the air, it could not claim command of the sea.
59
  Anthony 
Cordesman suggests that the “Argentines did a highly credible job opposing the first 
major British landing…they forced the two British carriers to operate outside the range of 
the Argentine air force…”
60
  He also suggests that despite turning back  261 out of  505 
Argentine sorties and killing 140 of those aircraft that did enter the exclusion zone, the 
British did not maintain command of the air because the Argentines were able to evacuate 
their wounded with Hercules C-130s on the last day of fighting around Port Stanley.
61
 In 
this instance, Cordesman is correct: Woodward did not have command of the air before 
he arrived to the area. Although they were able to support the fleet and ground troops 
from afar, Woodward had to keep his carriers as far east as possible as even damage to 
one carrier would have crippled the entire British campaign. Max Hastings and others 
argued in joust that the Admiral should have been awarded the South Africa Star for 







                                                 
59
 LTC James R. McDonough, “War in the Falklands: The Use and Disuse of Military Theory.” 
(Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General 
Staff College, 1987), 18 
60
Anthony H Cordesman, “The Falklands Crisis: Emerging Lessons for Power Projection and 
Force Planning,” Armed Forces Journal International, (September 1982): 33, 
61
 Ibid, 32 
62



























Admiral Woodward’s immediate superior, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 
echoed Koburger’s assessment of the sea power, agreeing that air superiority for the 
region as a whole was never achieved by British forces for the entire duration of the 
war.
63
 Leach points out that because the Argentine air force never flew out in full force, 
total air supremacy could never be achieved. Rather, he offers a very different 
interpretation of air command suggesting that British air power was instead “locally 
superior” during the war.  Leach’s phrase requires further analysis. He is suggesting that 
command of the air need not be defined geographically, whereas, it should be defined by 
mission accomplishment.  In this instance, British forces only needed superior air power 
when defending their carriers or protecting ground forces during the invasion of East 
Falkland.  The carriers were never seriously threatened throughout the war by the 
Argentine air force.  As well, while ships were lost, including the HMS Ardent, Antelope, 
Coventry, Atlantic Conveyor and Sir Galahad, disembarking troops and subsequent 
movement on East Falkland towards Port Stanley were never adequately threatened by 
the Argentine air force.  If the Belgrano and 25
th
 of May had carried out their pincer 
movement on the carriers, the British campaign to recover the islands would have been 
severely crippled, if not destroyed.  No further potential catastrophe involving the British 
navy and army and the Argentine air force ever materialized during the Falklands War.  
The British were able to ensure mission accomplishment with the Sea Harriers, as 
they were critical in the landing on East Falkland so “that logistics could move forward 
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prior to the establishment of an air defense umbrella.”
64
 Since many British ships lacked 
airborne early warning systems (AEW) and because the British carriers were not suited 
for larger aircraft, the Sea Harriers’ role in the war was crucial. Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred 
Price argue in Air War South Atlantic that the Sea Harrier’s reputation as an effective 
plane rose after the war.  During combat, the loss ratio of Argentine aircraft to Sea 
Harriers was 23:1, despite Argentina possessing three times as many jets and aircraft.
65
  
Despite having home-field, with multiple bases along the Argentine coast and even with 
Port Stanley airfield, the Argentine  air force still suffered high attrition rates while two 
British aircraft carriers provide suffice to support and maintain the entire operation.  The 
air war in the South Atlantic exhibited “both the power of the defense and the continuing 
need for an articulate strategy.”
66
 
Regardless of the debates over command of the sea and air, the amphibious 
invasion of the Falklands commenced with Operation SUTTON when 5,000 men of the 
3rd Commando Brigade landed at San Carlos, East Falkland, on 21 May.  Seeking a 
quick and decisive victory, British politicians pressured the British military to decide on 
an invasion point rather quickly.
67
  Both Port Stanley and Berkley Sound were too 
heavily defended with over 10,000 Argentines. Reluctantly, the Commando Brigade 
chose San Carlos water with the goal of capturing the Goose Green settlement. Of course 
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the ground commanders were worried about their own men, but the failure to capture 
Goose Green would have been a political blow, not a military blow. Since the ground 
combat stage of the war was marred by the sinking of several British transport ships, 
historians argue that the British began their ground assault with neither control of the sea 
nor air, a consequence of “politics driving the campaign.” 
68
 The Argentines could have 
targeted Goose Green but because of command, morale and intelligence issues within 
their own military, did not.  Therefore, the Argentines allowed the British to come to 
them in Port Stanley, failing to shape the war for themselves.   
Operation SUTTON, the British amphibious invasion, was a two pronged attack: 
2
nd
 Para were to head to Goose Green while 45 Commando and 3
rd
 Para were to hike 
towards Port Stanley.
69
  A major setback for the British invasion occurred when the 
transport ship Atlantic Conveyer, carrying vital Chinook helicopters, was hit. It sunk, 
taking down all but one Chinook.  The Commando units were then forced to “yom” their 
way through peat bog, stone and mountains towards their objectives. 
70
 Air superiority 
was accomplished as the Sea Harriers were able to maintain local superiority against 200 
Argentine land based aircraft.
71
 The British were surprised to discover that the Argentines 
had not established control of civilian communications, allowing British soldiers to call 
other units via telephones in settlers’ homes in different villages to trade intelligence.  
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Airborne Brigade in the U.S. Army. They are the British Army’s airborne unit, and generally 




, an elite force.  
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By 11 June, supported by naval gunfire from the British navy, which had moved 
from San Carlos, British soldiers captured the mountain tops surrounding Port Stanley. 
By the night of 13 June, the British were advancing on Port Stanley, encircling Argentine 
forces. The Argentines formally surrendered on 14 June 1982, marking the end of the 
war. The occupation of the Falklands by the Argentines was over in less than one 
hundred days. Over 11,848 Argentine prisoners were sent home and the British flag was 
raised once again at the Governor’s mansion.  Admiral Woodward refused to meet with 
Argentine ground commander General Mario Benjamin Menéndez, claiming his anger 
with the General was so great that “I could not trust myself to observe the full 
requirements of the Geneva Convention.”
72
  Woodward believed that “the man should 
have packed it in the day he found out the British had landed” and that the General’s 
“incompetence of his defense, along with his lack of perseverance” had delayed the 
inevitable and resulted in more deaths than necessary.
73
 
After the conclusion of the war, questions arose in Parliament regarding danger 
signs of an impending Argentine invasion and how they had been apparent for some time. 
Parliamentary debates also argued that prudent government “would have acted 
accordingly.”
74
 However, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign would later 
determine that the British had no firm evidence of Argentine intention to invade prior to 
31 March.
75
 Overall, British power was applied to the Falklands problem in six graduated 
phases, each signaling resolve, blending into the next phase: (1) advance into the South 
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Atlantic (2) blockade and isolation (3) reconnaissance; (4) recapture of South Georgia; 
(5) raids on the Falklands by commandos and aircraft; (6) recapture of the Falklands.
76
  
Hindered by the political wrangling back in London, the British military was able to 
achieve the near- impossible: travel over 8,000 nautical miles from home base, repossess 
the Falkland Islands in less than one hundred days, and still survive with fewer casualties 
than predicted.  
As the Americans discovered in Vietnam, the British military quickly realized the 
media could be both friend and foe.  Like American General George Patton, Admiral 
Woodward was extremely vocal and critical regarding many politicians and political 
decisions. British media were especially captivated by him, capitalizing on his outbursts 
and outspokenness with headlines including “Woodward Forecasts a Long and Bloody 
War” and “Walkover Woodward.”
77
 Woodward also expressed his distaste for the 
information the BBC World Service inadvertently provided for the Argentine military, 
supplying almost all of their intelligence about British activities.
78
   For example, the 
BBC announced the rendezvous point for Battle and Amphibious groups who were to 
lead the landing invasion.  The Commanding Officer of 2 Para, Lieutenant Colonel H. 
Jones, wanted to sue John Nott, the Prime Minister, the Defense Secretary and the BBC, 
charging them with manslaughter.
79
 Sadly, Colonel Jones was killed when leading 2 Para 
towards Goose Green and in that case, the BBC again prematurely announced that the 
                                                 
76
 Koburger, Jr., 28 
77
 Woodward, 109,111 
78
 Ibid, 112 
79




“PARAS ARE MOVING TOWARDS DARWIN.”
80
  The headline resulted in Argentines 
forces reinforcing the area, forcing the British to encounter more unexpected resistance.  
According to Woodward, there are still some who believe that the BBC report was 
directly responsible for the Argentine “ambush” that resulted in Colonel Jones’ death.  
While the Americans desired to remain neutral, there was undoubtedly an interest 
in the war as well. However, Woodward would have most likely expressed similar 
distaste for the American media as some reports published echoed the BBC’s reporting 
style.  The New York Times published headlines including “Ships said to move to a new 
formation” and “Likely Moves in an Attack.”
81
 Even  the British Economist and the 
Washington Post published extremely detailed reports from British sources stating that 
Argentine bombs were not fused properly, thus lowering the chance of denotation. 
82
 It is 
therefore evident that the British and American media showed little to no restraint when 
publishing privileged information.  British journalists even turned to the American media 
to complain of their treatment and handling by the British government. For example, 
Brian Hanrahan of the BBC complained to The New York Times that Woodward’s 
intention was to “cause as much confusion to the enemy as possible, and if there any way 
he could use us as part of the attempt, he intended to do so.”
83
   As British Secretary of 
State for Defence John Nott described the media: “…you are taught that you have to love 
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and co-operate with the press….the press are nothing but a pain in the arse! Whatever the 




Despite the small size of the war, and its limited relevance for world affairs, the 
historiography surrounding the Falklands War is extensive. American historians and 
sources tend to be extremely critical of the Falklands War, with some arguing that “it did 
not provide a long list of general lessons for future wars.” 
85
 Even American military 
members were skeptical of the Falklands War lessons. For example, U.S. Admiral Harry 
Train, then the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, told Admiral Woodward in 
September if 1982 that “there [were] no lessons to be learnt from your little war. Well no 
new ones anyway.”
86
 While important, Argentine sources are problematic as many 
demonstrate a propagandistic nature. This issue will likely continue until las Malvinas are 
an Argentine possession. Generally, South Americans show solidarity with their 
Argentine neighbors who, in their view, have been “wronged”. These South American 
sources need to be treated with caution as support for Argentina’s claims before, during, 
and decades after the war are still overwhelmingly unified in the continent.  
British accounts often focus on certain areas of the war: the British campaign, 
Argentine campaign, Ministry of Defence issues, the media and the politicians’ war. 
87
 
However, some works were published before government inquiries or reports were 
concluded.  Therefore, much of the earlier historiographical content consisted of 
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journalistic narratives and is often lacking in critical analysis. For example, Dr. Peter 
Calvert’s work heavily relies on The Times and The Guardian for sources and materials. 
Overall, works published by journalists, including those of Max Hastings and Simon 
Jenkins and The Sunday Times Insight Team, are extremely insightful. Notably, Hastings, 
who was a BBC war correspondent during the war, is especially critical of the military 
brass he worked with.
88
 Within the political historiography, readers need to assess the 
author’s political bias as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative 
government were either loved or hated. There really was, and still is, no in between, even 
to this day.  
The historiography will only continue to grow as government documents from 
The British National Archives (TNA) have just been released, in accordance with 
protocol to withhold documents until after the thirty year mark passes.  These new 
documents shed light on the extensive diplomatic and political affairs of the war and 
detail the extensive military planning for the Task Force. The documents give further 
insight for the media-government relations as well as foreign implications before and 
during the war. More importantly, the documents give substantial justification for the 
British government’s decision to sink the Belgrano, giving further reason to discard the 
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THE SINKING OF THE ARA GENERAL BELGRANO  
 
A man does what he must - in spite of personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and 
dangers and pressures - and that is the basis of all human morality. 
 
- Winston Churchill  
 
War cannot be a game of chess, with absolute rules of play. It is a paradox that even a 
just war can never be moral, but the overall good resulting from success can exceed the 
total sum of the evils.
 89
 
- Mr. Colin Croskin 
 
 
Although they were surprised by the invasion, the British immediately determined 
that the Argentine navy posed the greatest threat towards the recovery of the Falklands. 
The British Chiefs of Staff correctly concluded that “the Argentine navy would probably 
put to sea in order not to lose face.”
90
   To combat this, the British established a circular 
200 mile maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) centered around the islands on 12 April, which 
would “[demonstrate] our political will and could result in the sinking of major 
Argentinian warships.”
91
  Centered at latitude 51° 41’ South and longitude 59° 31’ West, 
the advantage of a circle was its precision, leaving no room for ambiguities in 
interpretation as the awkward shape of a territorial zone would have.
92
  The size was 
judged sufficient to provide enough room to be able to signal to a ship to stop, give chase 
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if it did not and if need be, fire a shot across the bow if it continued forward.
93
 The MEZ 
stated that any Argentine warship or naval auxiliary inside the MEZ was subject to attack 
by British nuclear-powered submarines (SSN).
94
  The majority of the British Task Force, 
including the carrier and amphibious groups, set sail for the Falklands on 5 April, while 
the rest of the fleet set sail between 7-9 April. Due to distance, it would require over three 
weeks travel for the surface vessels to reach the islands.  Due to the SSN’s faster travel 
speed, the MEZ announcement emphasized the threat of the SSN. When the rest of the 
Task Force neared the Falklands, including the aircraft carriers, the MEZ was enhanced. 
On 30 April, the same circular boundary was upgraded to the Total Exclusion Zone 
(TEZ) in which any Argentine ship, including naval, merchant and civil ships, or aircraft 
that was assessed to be a threat to the British Task Force was subject to unannounced 
attack.  The TEZ also stated that any foreign vessel or aircraft entering the zone was 
subject to attack. Argentine ships outside the MEZ and TEZ were not covered by those 
rules and thus outside the rules of engagement (ROE) for the British.  The MEZ and TEZ 
were incentives for Argentine units not to try to reach the Falklands, thus cutting off 
supplies for the Argentine garrison stationed there.
95
  Overall, the Argentines abided by 
the British MEZ and TEZ. Although some ships were able to skirt around the boundary 
before entering the zone and drop off supplies, no major component of the Argentine 
navy ever made it to the Falkland Islands.  Clearly, the Argentine navy feared the SSNs 
and wisely chose not to test British patience.   
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The Argentine military Junta was dominated by the hawkish navy but in spite of its 
efforts to present an image of power and prowess, the navy had only one aircraft carrier, 
the Veinticinco de Mayo or the 25th of May.  The pride of Admiral Anaya’s fleet, she was 
named after Argentina’s 25 May 1810 revolution. She was an “old aircraft carrier,” but 
was still a respectable threat as she was
 
able to “carry 7 to 9 A4 Skyhawk and, possibly, 
up to 5 Super Etendard aircraft.”
96
 The British aircraft carrier situation was not much 
better than the Argentines, as only two aircraft carriers remained in the British fleet, the 
HMS Hermes and the HMS Invincible.  Damage or loss of either carrier would threaten 
the entire British campaign to recover the islands and even with only 25
th
 of May, the 
“Argentines are thus able to threaten our forces from the air at a great distance from the 
Argentine mainland.”
97
  The British were especially worried about the carrier threatening 
the main amphibious task force, supply vessels and operations aircraft traveling to and 
from Ascension Island.
98
  The Skyhawks’ and Super Etendards’ combat radius of 500 
nautical miles posed a serious and immediate threat to “to all ships engaged in operations 
in the Falklands area but particularly to those ships on passage to and from Ascension 
Island.”
99
  For the overall campaign, the British sought similar action against the 
Argentine air force but “with limitations on mainland airfields, such action will be 
restricted to air engagements and attacks on the ground in the Falklands.”
100
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Subsequently, the British determined that the destruction of the 25
th
 of May would be a 
way to establish sea control given their own air force restrictions. It was then declared 
that “the best defense, therefore, would be to neutralize the carrier itself.”
101
   




a. To sink the carrier as soon as possible, wherever she is; 
b. To sink the carrier if any attack was made on our Naval or Air Forces by any 
Argentine Unit; 
c. To induce the “25
th
 of May” to return to port and stay there; 
d. To induce the “25
th
 of May” to stay within the Argentina internationally 





















525 nautical miles separated the Falkland Islands from 43°S 
                                                 
101
TNA:FCO 7/4609, Military Threat Posed to British Forces by the Argentine Aircraft Carrier 
“25
th




e. To confine the “25
th
 of May” within an area bounded by the parallel 43°S and the 





Option e would have kept the 25
th
 of May North and West of the indicated lines. 
Recognizing the carrier could also threaten travel to and from Ascension Island, Option e 
was drawn up.
103
  The Rhumb-line would have forced the Argentine carrier to travel a 
considerable and ill-advised distance before attacking the island.  Any attack at this range 
would have been inconceivable. Options c, d, e were contingent on the British issuing a 
warning for the 25
th
 of May to return to port within 48 hours and the Argentines doing so. 
Militarily, these options were “less attractive” than Options a or b because the British 
were not sure they could actually enforce them.
104
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Following the Argentine invasion, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher established 
a small War Cabinet, which was to take charge of the conduct of the war, called the 
Overseas and Defense Committee, South Atlantic (ODSA). ODSA was comprised of 
Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, Secretary for Defense John Nott, Home Secretary Willie 
Whitelaw and Tory Party Chairman Cecil Parkinson. Like the MoD, they listed five 
possible options for neutralizing the aircraft carrier:  
a. To sink the carrier as soon as possible wherever she is on the high seas. No 
warning;  
b. To sink the carrier immediately if our own naval/air forces were attacked by 
Argentine forces, regardless of whether or not the carrier was involved in the 
attack. A prior warning of our intention to adopt a generalized retaliatory 
posture of this kind could be given. The CNS [Chiefs of Staff Committee] 
would like the ROEs for the submarine outside the TEZ to be changed (at 
present it can only attack other conventional submarines) in order that the 
submarines could carry out this task ; 
c. To issue a warning to the Argentines that the carrier should be returned a port 
and remain there. If they did not do this, the carrier would be sunk;  
d. To issue a warning that the carrier should remain within the Argentine 
internationally recognized territorial waters (ie. 12 miles) and north of 43°S; 
e. To issue a warning that the carrier should be kept within a demarcated sea 
boundary for which co-ordinates would be given. This would keep its aircraft 




Since the Argentine navy only possessed conventional submarines, it is important to note 
the word “conventional” in Option b. There were concerns about Soviet SSNs in the area 
and it was highly unlikely the Soviets would send a conventional submarine in the region.  
It was vital that the British did not fire upon any other SSN: it would most likely be a 
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 The British were exceptionally concerned about international 
reaction to any potential sinking. Particularly, they were worried about tipping the Cold 
War superpowers, the Americans and Soviets, who were maintaining neutral stances, 
towards the Argentine cause.  Contingency plans for unrestricted attacks against 
Argentine naval units and military aircraft more than 12 miles from the Argentine coast 
were wisely disregarded.  Since the British navy was that much more capable than the 
Argentine navy, this option was given a “high visibility of success.”
107
 However, 
unrestricted warfare could “engender Organization of American States (OAS) world 
reaction against the UK; could alienate our friends and engender increasing political 
pressures at home.”
108
  Worse, it could “spread the conflict area, arouse adverse 
international reaction,” and allow for “possible reprisals, or unrestricted mob attacks 
against UK civilians on [the Argentine] mainland.”
109
 Instead, the British asserted that it 
was “entitled, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense as recognized in Article 




Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) Legal Adviser Sir Ian Sinclair and his 
deputy J.R. Freeland led the British consideration of the potential legal ramifications of 
any potential sinking.  Some diplomats, such as Sir Antony Acland, advocated surprise 
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SSN attacks, with a self-defense cover story, to announce “in unmistakable fashion that 
British submarines had arrived in the area.” 
111
 Determining that “the Legal Adviser 
would be unhappy about [this],” the MoD opted for and backed the less contentious 
Option b.
112
 While the Legal Advisers determined that the MoD Option e was the most 
defensible course in a legal point of view, they eventually conceded and agreed with the 
MoD on Option b. The Legal Advisers attached conditions to their decision, stating that 
“a carrier remaining sufficiently far North and West of the TEZ and the supply route 
would not pose an immediate threat to the British forces, and since we are relying on our 
right of self defense, it should not be attacked in a place where it does not constitute such 
a threat.”
113
  ODSA also concluded their own Option b was “tantamount to challenge the 
Argentines” and added that “it is not a strict interpretation of self-defense, in a sense that 
the sinking of the carrier eg. by a SSN could well occur in circumstances wholly removed 
in time and place from the Argentine action regarded as precipitating it.  A prior warning 
of our general intention to act in this way could only partially mitigate the difficulty.”
114
  
Both the MoD and ODSA agreed that a pre-emptive warning to the Argentines was 
needed to satisfy both internal and external political figures and likely criticisms. On 23 
April, the British passed a warning via the Swiss to the Argentines and in turn, the 
Argentines promptly responded with their own communique declaring “that it would treat 
as hostile all British shipping within 200 miles of the Argentine coast and within a 200 
                                                 
111
 TNA:FCO 7/4565, Falklands: Military Plan from Antony Acland  on 6 April 1982 
112
 TNA:FCO 7/4565, Falklands: Military Plan from Antony Acland  on 6 April 1982 
113
 TNA:FCO 7/4609, UK Task Force: Measure to neutralize Argentine Aircraft Carrier: 
Additional points to make, J R Freeland, Second Legal Adviser 30 April 1982 
114





mile radius of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.”
115
 To 
cover their bases and appease the Opposition
116
 and anti-war pundits, the ODSA 
concluded that before “an incident occurs requiring public comment to pre-empt or rebut 
Argentine criticism, we should publish the terms of the warning immediately from News 
Department, adding that it was conveyed formally to the Argentines before the incident in 
question took place.”
117
 By 30 April, the British had prepared a draft statement to be 
issued if the aircraft carrier was to be crippled or sunk without warning.
118
 
The British government was fully prepared, politically, legally and militarily, to 
sink the Argentine carrier inside the TEZ.  While the argument could be made that the 
TEZ was a political cover or ploy for further escalation by the British government, the 
government documents clearly signal a fear that the Argentine carrier might damage or 
even sink one of the British carriers.  The main objective was to retrieve the Falkland 
Islands, and the loss of either the HMS Hermes or Invincible, or worse, both, “would 
adversely affect command and control. It could give the Argentines local air superiority, 
if not over the Force, then over the Falkland Islands. Support for our land operations 
would be limited.”
119
  Not only was the Task Force at sea threatened, but “as a condition 
for landing operations, early action needs to be taken to nullify Argentine naval forces, 
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particularly the carrier and submarines.”
120
  To protect the Task Force, to prevent 
unnecessary loss of life and to launch a landing operation to recover the islands, the 
British government decided that if the 25
th
 of May entered the TEZ, it had to be sunk.  
 By the end of April 1982, the preparation and decision to sink the Argentine 
carrier was completed. Although both the MoD and ODSA agreed that the Task Force 
should only sink the carrier within the TEZ, there was considerable gray area in regards 
to the carrier’s assessed threat level. The MoD was especially concerned that the carrier 
might move into position outside the TEZ and then attack forward into the TEZ, quickly 
threatening the British Task Force.  This worry suggests the question: why would any 
Argentine ship enter the TEZ, fully knowing they increased their chances for detection 
and potential attack due to the higher number of British patrols in the area?  If the British 
were not to attack outside the TEZ, wouldn’t the Argentine navy then maneuver to attack 
the outside the TEZ?  The British did not want to take chances losing contact with any 
Argentine ship, fearing it would then be able to take a direct or quicker approach to the 
British Task Force by entering the TEZ. An example of this would be for the British to 
lose contact of any Argentine ship passing over the Burdwood Bank. Located at the edge 
of the South American continental shelf, it runs about 200 hundred miles from east west. 
South of the Falklands, the Atlantic is more than two miles deep, however, the slopes 
leading up to the continental shelf reach a general depth of about 300 hundred feet. In the 
bank, the depth climbs to a shallow 150 feet.  This area is particularly dangerous for a 
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submerged submarine trying to stay with a ship travelling at more than twenty-five 
knots.
121
 To avoid leaving a “clear wake of disturbed water” on the surface, a submarine 
needs to travel at a minimum of 200 hundred feet.
122
 Anything higher than that and the 
Argentines would have been alerted to the submarine’s presence.  If any Argentine ship 
cut across the Burdwood Bank, the British submarine would be forced to break contact 
and swing around the bank. By then, the Argentine ship would be long gone.  
Therefore, the British ROE for the use of the SSNs outside the TEZ was altered.  
In the early stages of planning the ROE for the SSNs outside the TEZ was confined to 
“SSN Rule One —covert surveillance only—and the SSN may only take offensive action 
in self defense or against conventional submarines it may detect (Rule five).” 
123
 
However, amending the ROE for SSNs was advocated by the MoD to include “for the 
possibility of submarine attack on the aircraft carrier” outside the TEZ. 
124
 On 1 May, 
ODSA decided to authorize an attack “without warning on the Argentine aircraft carrier 
outside our exclusion zone” and a new notification to the Argentine government was 
prepared. 
125
 The MoD also assessed that the “SSN would give the greatest chance of 
success with the least prejudice to other operations.”
126
  Clearly, the SSN was the favorite 
option by the British government: it could operate both covertly and quickly and the 
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Argentines could not easily counter the SSN since their own fleet did not posses any 
SSNs.
127
  However, assessing the carrier’s threat and deciding whether to use SSNs 
outside the TEZ were ultimately left by both the MoD and ODSA to the Task Force 
Commander, Rear-Admiral John Forster “Sandy” Woodward. It was determined that  
Woodward was “to have the same flexibility in using SSNs as he already has for surface 
ships and aircraft…or the decision made on the neutralizing of the carrier.”
 128
 In an effort 
to excuse themselves from any wartime decisions, the MoD placed responsibility on 
Woodward to decide which of their five proposed options to use to neutralize the carrier. 
Politely, they stated that “[whichever] option is preferred, it would be for the Task Group 
Commander to decide how to enforce it.”
129
 However, little did they, or Woodward 
know, that his assessment and decision would ultimately change the course of the 
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To me an unnecessary action, or shot, or casualty, was not only waste but sin. 
- T. E. Lawrence 
 
1 May marked the start of combat operations in the Falklands War with the British 
bombing the Port Stanley airfield. The British Task Force was approximately 140 
nautical miles (160 miles) east south east from Port Stanley or 70 nautical miles (81 
miles) from the center of the TEZ.  Since Sea Harriers were participating in the raid, the 
carriers were located well within the TEZ. On the afternoon of 1 May, Commander 
Christopher Wreford-Brown of the HMS Conqueror informed his superiors that he had 
spotted the cruiser ARA General Belgrano and her escorting destroyers.
130
 She was 
located on the southwestern edge, thirty miles outside the TEZ and travelling eastward in 
between Isla de los Estados and Burdwood Bank.  The Belgrano’s speed was 32 knots 
(60km/h) while her two destroyers, the Piedra Buena and Hipólito Bouchard   had a 
speed of 34 knots (63 km/h).
131
 By early morning of 2 May, Sea Harriers also made 
contact on the north-western side of the TEZ, detecting the Argentinian Carrier Battle 
Group: the 25
th
 of May and her escort of five ships.  However, the Sea Harriers had been 
“illuminated” by Argentine Sea Dart tracking radar and were forced to quickly peel 
away.
132
 Because the Sea Harriers were forced to peel away, they were unable to pin 
point the location of the carrier group. All that was known about the location of the 
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Argentine carrier group was that it was outside the TEZ, about 200 miles to the north-
west of the British Task Force, which was on the TEZ boundary due east of the 
Falklands.  The Belgrano group was also 200 miles away to the south-west from the Task 
Force. However, what made the groups extremely dangerous was that both carried Exocet 
missiles. The missiles contained a 364-pound warhead and had a 650 knot impact 
velocity.  Their range when launched from Super Etendard aircraft was 50-70km (30-45 
miles) and launched from a ship, the range was around 42 km (26 miles). 
1 May Intelligence reports did not ease British concerns.  The British intercepted a 
signal from Admiral Lombardo to all Argentine units, urging an early reconnaissance 
followed by a massive attack on the British fleet before any units had a chance to 
withdraw.
133
 Another intercepted message from Admiral Lombardo to Rear-Admiral 
Gualter Allara, the Argentine Commander at Sea, detailed orders for the carrier group to 
find British units and launch air attacks against them at first light on of 2 May.
134
 For the 
British, their worst fear was materializing: the carrier was in position and attempting to 
launch an air strike on the British Task Force. However, the Argentine carrier group’s 
location could not be accurately pin-pointed and even the SSNs, HMS Spartan and 
Superb, both of which were in the area, had no luck finding the exact location of the 
carrier.   Woodward assessed that Rear-Admiral Allara was attempting a classic pincer 
movement on the British Task Force with the carrier group descending from the north 
and the Belgrano group moving from the south.  Therefore, Woodward cautiously moved 
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his carriers to within 29 nautical miles (26 miles) of the eastern boundary of the TEZ as 
to lengthen the distance for the Argentines to travel.
135
  
Woodward’s assessment stemmed from a joint naval training exercise in November 
1981 with Greek, French, American and Omani navies in the Persian Gulf.  A particular 
exercise called for Woodward to give chase, detect and attack the carrier USS Coral Sea.  
The carrier’s radar systems were able to detect an enemy surface ship more than 200 
miles away and launch six missile-launching aircraft. Woodward’s destroyer did not have 
these capabilities; however he did not need modern technology to carry out the mission. 
He split his forces, sending the frigates towards the carrier on one side of the exclusion 
zone. He then maneuvered his destroyer, the Glamorgan, away from the Americans who 
were centered in a well-defended exclusion zone. Since Woodward feinted movement 
away from the carrier, the Americans lost contact with the Glamorgan. Instead, the 
Americans shifted focus on finding and “destroying” the frigates, which they successfully 
did. While the Americans were chasing the frigates, Woodward reversed course, turned 
toward the carrier, swinging around the opposite side of the exclusion zone. The 
Americans were never able to find the destroyer and Woodward was able to move the 
undetected Glamorgan into firing position, just eleven miles away (17.7km) from the 
carrier, and “fire” four Exocet missiles. Completely catching the Americans by surprise, 
the Glamorgan was so close that the Coral Sea could not “chaff up,” or launch counter 
measures. In war, the USS Coral Sea would have been another ship at the bottom of the 
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sea.  Despite losing one claw of the pincer, the other part of the pincer was able to 
accomplish the mission.  Woodward summarized lessons of the exercise: 
The first was to beware of becoming over-engrossed in one area of 
operations at the risk of ignoring another. The second was that, in a 
limited war, in perfect weather, under the cover of the darkness, one fairly 
old destroyer or cruiser, or whatever, is capable of getting right up to 
within eleven miles of a modern strike carrier in a full battle group. We 
had just done so from over two hundred miles away even in the face of 
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft up over the top and an armada of strike 




 What was materializing in the South Atlantic on 2 May 1982 was exactly what had 
happened in November 1981, and Woodward immediately recognized this.  The 
Belgrano group needed to be within 42km of the Task Force to launch the Exocet 
missiles since the group did not possess aircraft. However, this distance did not ease 
Woodward’s mind. If the British lost contact with her, she could emerge just as 
Woodward did against the Americans and by then, it would have been too late for 
defensive measures. Woodward concluded: “I cannot let that cruiser even stay where she 
is, regardless of her present course or speed. Whether she is inside or outsize the TEZ is 
irrelevant. She will have to go.”
137
 
The ROE were clear: no Argentine ship was to be attacked without provocation 
outside the TEZ. To protect his own carriers, the HMS Invincible and Hermes, 
Woodward needed the ROE changed immediately because he couldn’t locate the 25
th
 of 
May. Therefore, it was necessary to “take out one claw of the pincer.”
138
  However, by 2 
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May 0811Z, the Belgrano changed course and started travelling westward, outside the 
TEZ.
139
 This did not change Woodward’s interpretation of the unfolding events as he 
knew that “speed and direction of an enemy ship can be irrelevant, because both can 
change quickly. What counts is his position, his capability and what I believe to be his 
intention.”
140
 Woodward deduced that the Belgrano was just feinting a move away from 
the TEZ. Instead, the Admiral thought the Belgrano’s Captain Hector Bonzo was biding 
time and waiting for the command to enter the TEZ, travel across the shallow Burdwood 
Bank and attack the bulk of the British Task Force.  
Woodward ordered Commander Wreford-Brown to attack the Belgrano, but as 
expected, the order was immediately rejected as it clearly violated the ROE.
141
 The issue 
was relayed up to Commander-in-Chief Sir John Fieldhouse and Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Terence Lewin. After consultation with the Prime Minster and the War Cabinet, 
who agreed with Woodward’s assessment of the situation, the ROE were amended. Once 
the order came through, Commander Wreford-Brown needed to make a decision and 
quickly. The  HMS Conqueror carried two types of torpedoes: the newly developed and 
wire-guided Tigerfish torpedo, a single shot weapon that required a longer range to 
activate, and the older, short-range Mark 8** torpedo.  The dilemma the Commander 
faced was either to use the new but somewhat unreliable torpedo from a safer distance or 
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the older and reliable torpedo that required a shorter range. He decided to use the Mark 
8** torpedo, as despite its shorter range, which increased the chances of his submarine 
being detected, its consistent reliability left it favored by submarine commanders. 1380 
yards away, the commander gave the order to his Fire Controller to shoot at the target: 
the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. Three torpedoes were launched, resulting in 
large, fireball producing explosions. There was no time for the Conqueror to hang around 
and assess the aftermath once the hits had been confirmed, as she needed to avoid the 
Belgrano’s accompanying destroyers and their revenge-seeking depth-charges. With her 
rudder hard over, the submarine dove deep into the South Atlantic. As for the Belgrano, a 
fireball consumed a large portion of the ship; she rolled over and sank.  Since her 
destroyers were giving chase to the Conqueror, and because the other Argentine escort 
ships fled the area, rescue efforts were severely delayed. In total, 321 Argentine men 
perished, resulting in the largest loss of life in the Falklands War. By 22:45Z on 2 May, 
the British Armed Forces Headquarters in Northwood confirmed to the rest of the British 
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The sinking of the General Belgrano forced the retreat of and confined the Argentine 
navy within twelve miles off the Argentine coast.  Immediately after the sinking it was 
reported that “Argentine aircraft carrier group was in-shore of area Oscar, within 50 
fathoms and enjoying close air cover from the mainland…The frigate group north of 
Puerto Deseado had also drawn in closer to the coast. As for the BELGRANO group, 
there had been no report of destroyer activity since yesterday morning. .”
143
 Admiral 
Anaya wanted the remaining part of the pincer to continue on its mission but the 25th of 
May “commander had apparently questioned his order to move forward and launch air 
attack and had pulled back for reasons of weather and military prudence.”
144
 The 
Belgrano sinking shattered the Junta’s confidence in the navy and Admiral Anaya’s navy 
was never the same.  The British backed off too as the “Attorney-General had discussed 
the matter with the Prime Minister and had concluded that another attack against the 
Argentine carrier in current circumstances was unlikely to happen in circumstances 
which would leave us exposed to legal or military reproach.”
145
 Unless the Argentine 
carrier group moved to attack, it was to be left alone. However, the objective was already 
achieved: the Argentine navy was successful neutralized.  
The sinking of the General Belgrano occurred outside the TEZ, which made it the 
most contentious action of the entire Falklands War.  The situation, the location of the 
Belgrano before and after, and the change of the ROE added to the controversy and 
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confusion. Even two days after the sinking the British government was still confused on 
the Belgrano’s course stating that “no-one present could state whether the BELGRANO 
had in fact entered the TEZ before the attack.”
146
 The British intelligence did not help the 
government’s justification claims for sinking the ship either: 
“Bearing in mind the earlier intelligence that the Belgrano was likely to 
make a brief incursion into the Total Exclusion Zone, I asked whether we 
had any intelligence to show whether such an incursion had already been 
made when the Belgrano was torpedoed. I was told that there was no such 
intelligence, and in reply to my further question was told that the Belgrano 





However, the British did know that “at the time she was hit she was heading West at 
280.”
148
  Therefore, it was no surprise that controversy continued to grow when the 
location and travelling direction of the Belgrano were made public.  The House of 
Commons demanded answers.  Member of Parliament (MP) Mr. Denis Healey suggested 
that the sinking of the Belgrano might have “[weakened] or even [destroyed] the 
possibility of negotiations for a long-term solution.”
149
   MP Dr. John Gilbert was more 
critical of the government and questioned the motives behind the attack:  “was it not 
aimed at using the minimum force to achieve the maximum military advantage, but that, 
on the contrary, it was aimed at producing the maximum casualties and psychological 
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shock to the Argentines?”
150
  MP William Hamilton was worried about who was making 
the important decisions: “in other words, it was made by either the Prime Minister or 
[John Nott], or both of them together? Or was it made by the admiral on the spot? It is 
extremely important that the country should know who is making decisions to kill in the 
South Atlantic.”
151
   
However, the controversy did not erupt into major conspiracy theories until 
December 1982. An Official Dispatch regarding the Falklands was released to the 
London Gazette on 14 December and detailed the sinking of the Belgrano: 
On 2 May, the Argentinian cruiser the GENERAL BELGRANO, with two 
destroyers, was detected south of the Falklands by the H.M.S. 
CONQUEROR. The enemy force was in a position where it posed a 
serious threat to a number of our ships engaged in operations off the 
Falklands while other Argentinian surface units were poised to the north.  
It was a threat that could not be ignored and therefore H.M.S 
CONQUEROR was ordered to attack the GENERAL BELGRANO with 
torpedoes. Two struck the cruiser which sank some hours later. For over 
two hours Argentinian destroyer carried out several unsuccessful depth 
charge attacks against H.M.S CONQUEROR and then retired. Later they 
returned to rescue survivors. Through the campaign, the cost in human 
lives was my constant concern and in consequence, I [Commander-in-
Chief Fleet Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse] ordered H.M.S. CONQUEROR 
not to attack ships in rescue operations.
152
 
Nevertheless, this was not a sufficient answer for many in the Opposition or public. On 
21 December 1982 when MP Tam Dalyell alleged in Parliament that Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher “coldly and deliberately gave the orders to sink the Belgrano, in the 
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knowledge that an honorable peace was on the offer and in the expectation --- all too 
justified----that the Conqueror’s torpedoes would torpedo the peace negotiations.”
153
 In 
1984, Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice fueled the debate even further with the 
publication of The Sinking of the Belgrano.
154
 Mr. Dalyell and the authors argued that the 
British government deliberately sabotaged the Peruvian peace initiative that Peruvian 
President Fernando Belaúnde Terry had proposed on 2 May.
155
  According to the authors, 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her war cabinet knew of the peace proposal but 
were “never really seriously interested in negotiating.” The authors contend that it is 
“hard to avoid suspicions that the crews of both ships, the Conqueror as well as the 
General Belgrano, were used in a cynical politico-military machination which most 
Britons would want to see exposed.”
156
 Citing an interview with Captain Hector Bonzo, 
the authors also insisted the Belgrano was not part of a pincer movement as that was just 
“another speculation by the British government.”
157
 The sinking of the Belgrano spiraled 
into an angry debate: a war crime or a justified act of war?  
The debate over the sinking continued to grow and change in the decades after the 
war.  However, new evidence and interpretations have come to light.  Commissioned by 
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British government, two volumes of The Official History of the Falklands Campaign 
composed by Sir Lawrence Freedman were published in 2005. Freedman determined the 
controversy had grown because of confusion over time zones and when intelligence 
reached London. He also cited discrepancies in reports, both official and unofficial, that 
fueled the controversy. For example, there was confusion whether two or three torpedoes 
were fired (it was three) and if the Conqueror detected the Belgrano on 1 May or 2 May 
(it was 1 May).  Interestingly, Freedman states: “there is no evidence that the cruiser’s 
change of course was well known in MoD and Navy circles in May 1982.”
158
 However, 
documents obtained for this thesis illustrate that on 4 May 1982 the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee did know that “at the time she was hit she was heading West at 280°.”
159
 
Freedman’s choice of “well known” is merely a disclaimer in that not everyone in the 
MoD or navy knew of the course at the time of the attack. Indeed, an examination of the 
Conqueror’s war diary confirmed that it had been expecting the Belgrano to turn into the 
TEZ. Freedman criticized Gavshon and Rice’s work, citing their lack of evidence and 
impossible assumptions about what the British could have known and the speed with 
which the senior politicians might have known about the Peruvian peace initiative.
160
 
Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins also brush aside the conspiracy theories regarding the 
Peruvian peace initiative.  They argue that it would be hard to believe that the Junta 
might have been on the “brink of conceding a virtually identical peace formula to that so 
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recently and comprehensively rejected from Haig.”
161
 After consulting his own Argentine 
sources, both Freedman and the sources became convinced that Gavshon and Rice’s 
conspiracy did not hold up. In particular, Freedman and his sources analyzed Argentine 
signals that might have indicated British knowledge of the Argentine withdrawal as early 
as 2007Z on 1 May.
162
 However, it was determined this was confusion caused by 
Admiral Anaya who had actually initiated offensive operations. 
  Witness statements changed as well. Just before his death in 2009, Captain 
Bonzo publicly stated that the sinking “was absolutely not a war crime. It was an act of 
war, lamentably legal.”
163
 He also stated that “when they gave us the authorization to use 
our weapons, if necessary, we knew we had to be prepared to attack, as well as be 
attacked. Our people were completely trained. I would even say we were anxious to pull 
the trigger.”
164
 According to Bonzo’s interview, “the Argentine navy had changed its 
rules of engagement, and he was under orders to fire on any British warships that came 
within range of his guns.”
165
 Other British sources cite Argentine Admiral Enrique 
Molina Pico’s admission that the Belgrano was “heading away from the enemy fleet only 
momentarily, as the commander saw fit to wait for a more convenient time (to attack).” 
166
  In 2011, Major David Thorp published his findings regarding the sinking of the 
Belgrano in The Silent Listener. As a former British intelligence officer, he was tasked 
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by Prime Minister Thatcher to collect all data and intelligence regarding the sinking. He 
concluded that “the destination of the vessel was not to her home port as the Argentine 
Junta had stated but the objective of the ship was to relocate to a prearranged rendezvous 
point (RZ) within the exclusion zone.” 
167
 His report also determined that: 
 Shortly after the UK’s announcement of an exclusion zone, the 
Argentinian Navy HQ notified its warships, possibly for the purpose of re-
grouping, of a pre-arranged rendezvous point (RZ). When the coordinate 
for this RV were plotted on a map, the actual location, though east of the 
Falkland Islands, was nevertheless inside the 200 nautical miles exclusion 
zone. Some considerable time prior to Conqueror firing its torpedoes, my 
analysis revealed that the Belgrano had been instructed to alter course and 
head in the direction of the RV inside the exclusion zone.
168
 
However, Major Thorp’s work should be treated with caution. While he cites secret 
papers, no record of this investigation, or request of an investigation, were found in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth office documents released in 2012. As well, there is no 
mention of any “rendezvous” point in Admiral Woodward’s biography, Freedman’s 
official history, or any other major works referring to the Falklands War.  
 The controversy surrounding the sinking of the General Belgrano has died down 
significantly.  Recent admissions by former Argentine military and officials along with 
analysis of both Argentine and British intelligence have rightly so silenced many 
“Belgranauts.”
169
 However, the recently released government documents offer a new 
interpretation about the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano.  The main concern and 
real target of the British Task Force was the Argentine aircraft carrier, the 25
th
 of May.  
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Before any landing operation commenced, the British needed to neutralize the Argentine 
navy, and to achieve that, the target became the carrier. All legal and political 
preparations were made and ready by 30 April for this sinking. However, the events that 
occurred between 1 and 2 May called for changes in the plan. The British knew the 
carrier group was to the north but they did not know where exactly. Nevertheless, they 
did know exactly where the General Belgrano group was located. With intelligence and 
Admiral Woodward’s training experience, the decision was made: the Belgrano, not the 
carrier, was to be sunk.  This was not a simple decision as the cruiser was located outside 
the TEZ, and thus not covered by the ROE. However, government planning had allowed 
for SSNs to engage outside the TEZ, under the discretion of the Task Force Commander. 
The British government knew this would not be received well by the Opposition, the 
Argentines, other countries and anti-war advocates but the decision to change the ROE 
was carried out of necessity for the campaign. For the overall British success in the 
Falklands War, the sinking of the Belgrano was crucial.  Not only did the Argentine navy 
remain close to the mainland for the duration of the war, but the British Task Force, and 
more importantly, the carriers, were never seriously threatened during the war.  
Unfortunately after the war, confusion over time zones and what was known when only 
compounded the fury over the decision.  The Belgranauts’ adverse reactions and anger 
with the British government in the 1980’s were certainly justified at the basis of the 
information available at that time. But with the recently released government documents, 
their anger needs to be re-directed. Perhaps they can conjure conspiracies regarding the 






FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND THE MEDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF BRITISH 
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS  
 
I am told that nowadays in these great establishments you are all taught that you have to 
love the press and co-operate with the press. I hope you are also taught, outside the 
meetings that the press are nothing but a pain in the arse! Whatever the circumstances, 




- Secretary of State for Defense John Nott   
 
While caught off guard by the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the British 
certainly, albeit unintentionally, contributed to the chaos and confusion months, and even 
years, before the conflict. Despite repeated warnings from the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) of a possible military threat, dating back to November 1978, the British 
had sold more than £ 200 million worth of naval, aerial and electronic equipment, 
missiles and other weapons to Argentina.
171
  In 1981, Secretary of State for Defense John 
Nott’s Defense Review, in an effort to slash budgets and focus on NATO commitments, 
proposed reductions for the British military, cuts which primarily affected the naval 
forces. These cuts called for the Royal Navy to lose one fifth of its 60 Destroyers and 
Frigates, the HMS Invincible to be sold to the Australians, the HMS Hermes to be 
decommissioned, landing platform dock (LPD) class ships HMS Intrepid and Fearless to 
be scrapped and the icebreaker HMS Endurance to be pulled from the South Atlantic.
172
 
                                                 
170
 John Nott,  in “The Falklands War,” seminar held 5 June 2002 (Centre for Contemporary 
British History, 2005, http://www.icbh.ac.uk/witness/falklands/), 59 
171
 Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1984), 17 
172
 Many Members of Parliament (MP) believed pulling the HMS Endurance out of the region 




While the Defense Review’s plan and all sales were immediately scrapped when the 
Argentines invaded, the British military had already faced cancellations for technological 
upgrades, and major reductions in logistical units and supplies in the years before. The 
British had plenty of men but they desperately needed any support in these areas.  To 
further exacerbate the situation, the British government was not only worried about its 
own military’s capability, but it was also concerned about other countries, such as Brazil 
and Venezuela, that supported Argentine claims to the islands. There were worries that 
they might back the Argentine cause with sizeable force and supplies.
173
  The 
Government assessed Argentina’s neighbors, other Latin American countries, the 
Americans, and the Soviets for military capabilities and potential assistance.  
Throughout the Falklands War, the Americans sought to maintain a publicly 
neutral stance due to their “reservations about the broad strategic consequences of the 
campaign.”
 174
 These “reservations” were based on the fear that joint British-American 
action could lead to Soviet involvement in the conflict and worse, involvement in the 
Western hemisphere, America’s backyard.
175
 The Americans were trying to gather 
support for their proposed South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO), including South 
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Africa, Uruguay and Argentina. The aim was to block Soviet influence in the region. 
With the Panama Canal and South Atlantic in their control, the Americans were seeking 
more control of the linking points of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
176
 Joint British-
Allied actions in the Falklands would jeopardize this mission and the American efforts 
between June 1981 and February 1982 would have been in vain. 
177
  
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) American Admiral Harry 
Train offered another explanation for the American stance. He argued that since the 
United States projected substantial power in the Organization of American States (OAS), 
the credibility of the organization would be severely reduced if “potential aggressors 
believed that the OAS had no effective arrangements for collective security.”
178
  Train 
rationalized that because the OAS did not collectively support action on the behalf of 
Argentina, the Americans could lose face with other OAS members if they involved 
themselves on either side without authorization. Albeit overreaching in concern, he 
worried that American action on British behalf could call into question the overall 
strength of the alliance.  Train wanted to avoid the question of: how could one state say 
they support and belong to an organization and yet partake in unauthorized action that 
said organization does not endorse?  However, Admiral Train’s fears are exaggerated: the 
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Americans were (and still are) the most influential member of the OAS. They certainly 
did not fear any damaging repercussions from the organization.
179
 
However, the Americans were actually more concerned with NATO 
commitments. They were also extremely apprehensive about helping the British, let alone 
being associated with their actions; they feared British association could jeopardize 
American relations with regional allies as well as political, economic and influence 
within Latin America and South America.
180
  Ultimately for the Americans, the cost of 
publicly alienating Britain outweighed the cost of potentially damaging pro-American 
sentiments within those countries.  
However, despite uneasiness about assisting the British campaign, and even while 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s negotiations were ongoing, the Americans were 
covertly “prepared to offer increased assistance to the UK should the Haig negotiations 
fail.”
181
 Accordingly, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked her aides to examine 
whether American assistance would be accepted by the rest of Her Majesty’s 
Government.
182
 While negotiations were ongoing, Thatcher instructed that a preliminary 
study be made into the “areas in which the UK would benefit from increased U.S. support 
                                                 
179
 For example, while the British maintained control of Ascension Island, the base itself was built 
by the Americans, with permission from the British.  While arguably some OAS members would 
interpret this action as helping the British, the Americans did not object to the British using their 
base for the Falklands campaign.  
180
 Many of these countries had publicly voiced solidary for the Argentine “cause” in 
“recovering” rightful territory.  
181
 TNA: FCO 7/4473, Attachment to COS (Hiso) 161/742/1 Operation Corporate: U.S. 
Assistance. Notes: 1. BDS Washington AA/A2D 200100Z April 82 WASDO 08 
182
 There are no records in the FCO collection of the findings of this request. One has to assume, 






 Assumptions were immediately made in regards to 
the level of commitment the Americans were willing to give: the U.S. would not commit 
forces to hostilities and base facilities in South America would not be available to the 
U.S. for overt support of UK operations.
184
 Instead, the British government sought 
logistical and technological military assistance from the Americans. At the top of the list 
were intelligence capabilities including amplified satellite and meteorological coverage, 
increased surveillance and information on the South Atlantic surface and sub-surface 
plots, U2 planes and long range Maritime Radar Recon and Air-to-Air refueling 
operations. The British also needed increased access and priority in U.S. Defense 
Satellite Communications systems.  For transporting any subsequent reinforcements to 
and from Ascension Island, the British considered asking for American amphibious 
shipping support. Finally, the British asked the Americans for logistics support, weapons, 
equipment and material supplies.
185
 However, all of the requested items and materials 
were not considered crucial to the success of OPERATION CORPORATE while 
requirements “would need to be reviewed in the event of intensive hostilities.”
186
 
The other Cold War superpower created a sticky situation for the British.  
Intelligence reports indicated that a Soviet Krivak class destroyer and an Alligator 
Landing Ship, Tank (LST) had left Luanda, Angola heading towards the Falklands as 
early as 14 April.  There were also worries about the capability of Soviet satellites to 
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track the British fleet’s movements. To combat this, when satellites were known to be 
overhead, the Task Force was forced to maintain electronic silence to avoid detection.  A 
major concern for the British was the amount of activity near or surrounding Ascension 
Island. The island was located 4,200 miles from Britain and 3,800 miles from the 
Falklands and served as the halfway point from the British Task Force.  The one airfield 
on the island was extremely critical for the mission; furthermore the island provided the 
last stopping point before the Task Force set out for the Falklands. Any threat to the 
island would serve as a threat to the entire campaign. Soviet BearD Aircraft were 
carrying out reconnaissance sorties within 50 miles of the island and an AGI ship had 
been shadowing the British troop transit ship SS Canberra since it left the Mediterranean 
for Ascension Island. 
187
  On 29 April, a Soviet intelligence gathering vessel, the 
Primorye, approached Ascension Island from the north.
188
 This was especially alarming 
for the British. Although the Soviets never directly threatened Ascension Island, and 
there was never indication that they were going to, the British knew they were gathering 
intelligence. What remained to be seen was if the Soviets were providing the Argentines 
with any of that intelligence.
189
 Throughout the campaign, the British fears of Soviets 
supporting the Argentines never subsided.   
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Of greater concern to the British was the potential for an accident or unintentional 
escalation of war to include the Soviets. For example, the implementation of the 
Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and then the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), immediately 
raised alarms about potential Soviet involvement. Though the British nuclear powered 
submarines (SSN) were able to make distinctions between nuclear and conventional 
submarines, British surface ships lacked the capability to make a highly accurate 
assessment of the type of detected submarine.  The Argentine naval fleet had only 
conventional submarines; however, any SSN operating on less than “its full capability” 
could have been interpreted to be a conventional submarine.
190
  Consequently, there was 
a risk of a Soviet SSN entering the zone and being mistaken for an Argentine 
conventional submarine and attacked. British military and intelligence officials 
determined that the “Ministers should be aware of this possibility.”
191
 While the British 
sought logistical and technological support from the Americans, they feared any 
unfortunate encounter with the Soviets or any accidental escalation of war with Argentine 
allies.   
Potential Argentine allies included Latin American and South American countries 
that harbored sympathies for the Argentine invasion.  The British government listed 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, French Guiana, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay and other 
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Caribbean countries as potential Argentine allies. However, they were determined not to 
be threats as they had “nothing significant to contribute” due to their lack of military 
capabilities.
192
  Columbian intervention was ruled out because of “[wariness] of 
Venezuela” and Ecuador was ruled out because of “[wariness] with Peru.”
193
  Brazil, 
Cuba, Peru and Venezuela were determined to be possible candidates for intervention on 
behalf of Argentina.
194
 However, these fears were quickly dismissed.  Reports surfaced 
that the Brazilian navy was out to sea, including a carrier, but it was assessed to part of a 
naval exercise which had been planned for some months before and unrelated to the 
crisis. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that 6 Peruvian FBA 
Aircraft had been deployed with Argentine units. This report was discounted because the 
“Rio Treaty had not been invoked and the Peruvian government had denied alerting her 
force.”
195
 Otherwise known as the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the 
Rio Treaty called for agreeing nations to support each other against military threat from 
outside the continent. The Rio Treaty was never invoked during the Falklands War: two 
thirds majority was needed for joint action against the British and although a member, 
Argentina “traditionally stood aloof from the organization.”
196
 There was only one 
instance that concerned the British in regards to Bolivians. A report surfaced that the 
Bolivian Air Force had been put at the disposal of Argentina. Oddly, the British easily 
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 It is odd that the British considered Cuba as a potential Argentine ally when Cuba despised 
military Junta government.  
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disregarded this report because it “did not reflect official Bolivian government policy.”
197
  
There was no further mention of potential Bolivian involvement.  
The British did consider bringing the fight to the Argentine mainland. The 
military considered landing in Southern Argentina (Tierra del Fuego) at the end of May at 
the earliest. Politically, this would have been a severe blow to the military Junta and 
would have provided a “bargaining counter for withdrawal of Argentine forces from the 
Falkland Islands.”
198
 The military was optimistic that it was able to “demonstrate the 
capability to extend the conflict.”
199
  However, as a member of the United Nations and 
the Security Council, the British needed to abide by the UN Charter.  In particular, the 
British government was especially concerned with Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. It stated: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
200
 
Under the pretenses of self-defense of British territory, the British could have argued that 
invading the Argentine mainland would have stopped supplies from reaching the 
Argentine garrison and as well as preventing aerial raids and bombings of the Task Force. 
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However, the Government concluded that it would face severe repercussions 
internationally and domestically as the “legitimacy under Article 51 of [United Nations 
Charter] would be challenged.”
201
  Since there was no declaration of war by either side, 
the British determined that “self-defense” for the Falklands would not be a sufficient 
excuse for invading mainland Argentina under the terms of Article 51. While the military 
believed they could extend their current capabilities onto the mainland, the government 
also determined that any mainland invasion would invalidate the TEZ, thus opening the 
waters surrounding the Falklands. Ultimately, an Argentine mainland invasion would 
“greatly reduce capacity for subsequent operations against Argentine Forces on the 
Falkland Islands, which is the UK aim.”
202
  
However, the British did conclude that the feasibility of landing in south 
Argentina rested on the use of appropriate Chilean airfields or the full co-operation of the 
Chilean air force.  Such contingency plans included increased military co-operation 
between the British and Chileans, involving the possibility for a formal military alliance.  
Cooperation with Chile would divide Argentine forces and compel Argentina to meet 
threats on two fronts. The British hoped by drawing Argentine forces away from the 
Falkland Islands they could relieve pressure on air cover operations over the islands.  Full 
cooperation with Chileans would give the British access to Chilean bases which would 
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“offset the Argentine geographical advantage.”
203
 However, while the military 
advantages were tempting, the political disadvantages completely overrode these military 
considerations.  It was determined that politicians in both Chile and the United Kingdom 
would never accept this and it would “remove possibility of all-party political support in 
the UK.”
204
  Overall, Chilean-British cooperation would likely draw in Latin American 
and possibly other nations “and engender strong adverse international reaction.”
205
   The 
“feasibility” of Chilean-British military cooperation was determined to be “doubtful.”
206
 
Despite the assistance, the Americans were adamant that the extent of their 
involvement and assistance remain undisclosed. Since the U.S. Administration was 
divided on supporting the British during the war, “sensitivities” remained within the 
American government even months after the war.
207
 To combat rumors and speculation 
in the media, the British decided to acknowledge what was being reported yet deny any 
further information: “The fact that we had the STINGER air defense weapon (and that it 
scored one kill) is already acknowledged by us, but not when or how it was acquired. We 
are currently using AM2 matting at Port Stanley airfield, but neither this nor the supply of 
other U.S. material should be specifically acknowledged.”
208
 When “pressed on details on 
U.S. supply of equipment and the assistance provided by the U.S. to the UK during the 
conflict,” the government chose  “[not to go] into details about the scale and nature of the 
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assistance provided during the campaign.”
209
  The British determined that any matter of 
that sort, including to what extent the Americans assisted, would be left for the U.S. 
Government to comment on.
210
  Instead, the standard British government response was to 
be: “the assistance provided by the U.S. to the UK during the conflict was based on the 
wide-ranging pattern of peacetime defense collaboration between our two 




The degree of acknowledgement of American assistance exemplified the dilemma 
the British government faced with the media. The British faced a double edged sword: 
the media, including British, American, Argentine and other foreign sources, needed to 
be kept at arm’s length but not too far away.   Friction between the media and authorities 
immediately began when many British media members wanted to report the war as 
“dispassionately as possible.”
212
 Citing fears of media relations similar to those the 
Americans faced during the Vietnam War, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) initially 
resisted allowing journalists and news correspondents to sail down with the Task Force. 
However editors who “had the ear” of the Prime Minister persuaded her to allow their 
correspondents to travel with the Task Force. 
213
  In Vietnam, correspondents and 
journalists had been granted extraordinary freedoms to go anywhere, see everything and 
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   In general, the American media in Vietnam showed 
restraint in reporting and publishing sensitive details and was much more likely to 
cooperate with military officials. In complete contrast, the British government feared the 
lack of control by the British media to self-censor or honor agreements with military 
officials. To minimize the publishing of sensitive information, this became one aspect of 
the war the MoD fully controlled:  only British correspondents were allowed to 
accompany the Task Force and to do so, they had to sign forms agreeing to censorship.   
Foreign journalists were forced to pursue other alternatives. ABC television even 
considered chartering a tramp steamer, offering space to other American televisions 
networks and newspapers. However, since the British threat to sink any ship in the TEZ 
did not make exemptions for American press boats, the tramp steamer never set sail.
215
  
For the journalists who remained in London, anger grew when all background 
briefings were stopped when the Task Force set sail. They were later resumed under 
pressure from the Downing Street press officer, Bernard Ingham, who ill concealed his 
contempt for the [Ministry of Defense’s] information performance.
216
 Friction was also 
created between the British government and Reuters, the international news agency, 
when the latter refused to be bound by D-Notices.
 217
  Short for Defense Notice, D-
Notices were official requests from the British government to news editors not to publish 
                                                 
214
 In many cases, the American military would brief journalists about an upcoming mission and 
asking the media not to report it until the mission was underway. The American media was 
consistently good at obeying requests and cooperating with the military, just as long as the 
military continued giving them access.  
215
 Phillip Knightley, "The Falklands: How Britannia ruled the news." 51-53 as cited in TNA: 
FCO 7/4461, Media Coverage 
216
 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York, W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1983), 332 
217




news items on specified subjects for reasons of national security. When the British 
government sent a D-notice to Reuters not to report the location of the British fleet in 
relation to Ascension Island, the editor was not concerned for the security of “our forces,” 
since Reuters was not a British news agency.
218
 British news agencies also resisted the D-
notices.  Peter Hennessy, writing for both The Times and Economist in 1982, argued with 
officials over the MoD’s heavy-handed re-vetting of already vetted copy from the Task 
Force.
219
  Throughout the entire campaign, there was a constant tug of war between the 
British government and the media: when the MoD complained of speculation about 
operational plans and reporting of assistance from third countries, arguing that such 
reporting jeopardized any help, editors countered with complaints of “paucity of 
information,” delay in announcing operations which were already over, and the MoD’s 
inability to confirm or deny information obtained from other sources.
220
 At a typical MoD 
press conference, a spokesman would have issued a statement as follows: “We have no 
reports of any major Argentine warships or auxiliaries having penetrated the maritime 
exclusion zone.”
221
  After a few seconds, the press corps “would be on its feet trying to 
pin him down,”: “what do you mean by ‘reports?”, “why ‘major ships’?”, “Did 
‘penetrate’ mean from the mainland to the islands or from the islands to the mainland as 
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  The debate between the MoD and the media boiled down to the conflict 
between the protection of servicemen’s lives and the “public’s right to know.” 
223
 To 
exemplify this, the MoD lied when denying reports that HMS Invincible had suffered a 
breakdown in one of the engines soon after it departed from Portsmouth.
224
Since the 
carrier was vital to the entire campaign, the MoD wished to keep the information 
confidential, not just from the press but more importantly, from the Argentines.   
Friction between military personnel and journalists sailing with the Task Force 
continued to grow after the Task Force departed from Ascension Island. Satellite 
communications on HMS Hermes were limited, restrictions set in place to limit the 
number of journalists allowed on ship, and military unhappiness over breaches of 
security, including reports of departures of ships from Ascension Island, continued to add 
fuel to the fire.  A particular battle between the BBC and Task Force Commander Rear 
Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward emerged while the Task Force was en route to the 
Falklands. Brian Hanrahan of the BBC alleged that Admiral Woodward told reporters 
that “it was his intention to cause as much confusion to the enemy as possible, and if 
there was any way he could use us as part of the attempt, he intended to do so.”
225
 An 
extremely vocal and opinionated officer, Admiral Woodward gave an interview regarding 
the South Georgia Island recapture in which he was quoted as saying “South Georgia was 
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the appetizer, now this is the heavy punch coming up behind. My Battle Group is 
properly formed and ready to strike. This is the big-run up to the Big Match which my 
view should be a walkover. I’d give odds of 20 to 1 on, to win.”
226
 The headline for the 
article, “WALKOVER WOODWARD”,” produced a strong reprimand from both the 
British government and higher military officials but it also prompted Woodward to hold 
back information from the media: “Personally, I found myself tempted to use this modern 
communication tool which might just have had enough effect on world opinion to cause 
the Argentines to think again; hence my much published interview after South Georgia 
while my personal views were much less sanguine.”
 227
 While safety measures were taken 
to prevent security breaches, the Task Force quickly learned that the “information to the 
Press cannot be confined to formal briefings and while dispatches to newsdesks can be 
vetted, it is infinitely more difficult to censor the telephone conversations conducted over 
modern satellite systems.”
228
  New technologies presented new challenges for control of 
the press. From sailing to Ascension Island to the conclusion of the campaign, the 
relationship between the war correspondents and military officials remained acrimonious.  
The British and American media were keen on creating headlines and selling 
newspapers.  As they turned to consulting retired admirals and generals for ‘expert’ 
commentary, there was constant speculation about British movements and intentions.  In 
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many cases, what the BBC and other media outlets were reporting was accurate. For 
example, the British air support difficulties and disadvantages were listed just as the Task 
Force arrived within the TEZ: “The 10 Harrier jump jets with the lead ships in the fleet 
may soon be reinforced by another 10, an authoritative source said.”
229
  Just before the 
mainland invasion of the Falklands, The New York Times accurately reported that “Rear 
Admiral John F. Woodward, the task force commander, was gathering his vessels into 
one group, with the amphibious assault ships Fearless and Intrepid and smaller logistical 
landing craft positioned for an attack on the Falklands.”
230
 There were of course 
inaccurate reports as well. For example, the media often and incorrectly announced 
Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) patrols had landed on the 
islands
231
. These claims were based on “unreliable American ‘sources’.”
232
   However, 
while the British officials were not keen on the media speculating and reporting accurate 
and detailed information, many of these reports actually harmed the Argentines.  The 
inaccurate SAS and SBS reports kept Argentine forces on high alert, only to fatigue them 
for the actual invasion. Reports of Task Force movement and capabilities certainly hurt 
Argentine morale as many Argentines soldiers were conscripted as well as ill-equipped 
and ill-prepared for combat. Knowing a powerful military was on its way to recapture its 
territory would have undoubtedly scared these soldiers.  
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There were instances, however, when the media’s drive to be the first to report 
also immensely helped the Argentines, who would come to rely on the media, most often 
the BBC, for a majority of their intelligence about British activities.  During the mainland 
invasion of East Falkland, several bombs dropped on British ships did not detonate, thus 
saving countless lives. Partially this was because they were being dropped at too low an 
altitude, but the primary reason was because the fuses were set incorrectly. Luckily, the 
Americans, who had supplied the Argentines with bomb fuses before the invasion, were 
aware that the fuses were not being set correctly. They never got in touch with the 
Argentineans to alert them to the incorrect fusing.
 233
  However, after being briefed by the 
MoD, the BBC reported the failure of the bombs to detonate and thus alerted the 
Argentines to the issue. The MoD’s worst fears materialized as these reports were 
published “without thought for the operational risks.”
234
 The Ministry complained that 
not only did the BBC broadcast the information in London, “for the ears of any 
Argentinian diplomat or military attaché, they actually put it out on the World Service for 
the entire South Atlantic to hear.”
235
 As British troops were advancing in the San Carlos 
Water area after the landing on 21 May, the BBC again prematurely announced that “the 
Paras are moving towards Darwin.”  With the element of surprise gone, not surprisingly, 
the Paras met strong Argentine resistance in Darwin. Paras” is short for Parachute 





Airborne of the US Army. After the BBC announced the movement, Argentine forces 
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were reinforced in the area. Admiral Woodward doubted that the Para Regiment would 
ever be able to entirely forgive the BBC for this.
 236
 
The British also had to counter Argentinian information that was being picked up 
by the BBC. Although much of the information the Argentinians were reporting was 
incorrect, there were instances when Argentine reports were correct and even 
contradicted British reports. An example of this was especially evident with the British 
bombing of Port Stanley airfield on 1 May. The Argentines reported that the bombings 
had had no significant effect on the runway and therefore, they were still able to resupply 
the garrison.  This was indeed true; the runway was never properly put out of commission 
throughout the entire war.  The British did know that the 1 May raid did not put the 
runway out of commission but were eager to save public face because they had boasted 
of the success of the run.  They insisted the runway was out of commission and 
“confidently discounted [the Argentine report regarding the runway] throughout the 
campaign as just more of many wild boasts coming from Buenos Aires.”
237
  Since the 
Argentines were notorious for reporting multiple “sinkings” of ships, (and these ships 
were never actually sunk, nor properly attacked), the British counters to “wild boasts” 
from Argentina were believable.  For example, on 30 May, the Argentinians reported 
they had attacked and sunk the HMS Invincible with an Exocet missile. The Argentine 
pilots claimed to have seen the ship hit as smoke was billowing from below. Argentine 
newspapers even published photos of the Invincible burning. In reality, the Exocet missile 
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missed two frigates, the HMS Exter and Avenger. The smoke the pilots reported was 
actually from the Avenger’s 4.5 inch anti-aircraft gun while the Invincible was twenty 




Even then, and because the Argentines had come to rely on British sources for 
intelligence, there were instances when the British government was able to prevent the 
Argentines from gaining valuable intelligence.  Nevertheless, the British faced a double-
edged sword with this ability: attention had to be paid both to the sensitivities of next of 
kin and the intelligence value of disclosure to Argentina.
239
 On 25 May, the Type 42 
destroyer HMS Coventry was sunk and the Atlantic Conveyor, a transport ship, was 
severely damaged by the Argentines and eventually sunk.  The Argentines had wasted 
two of their five Exocet missiles on the Atlantic Conveyor as they believed her to be a 
frigate or destroyer.  The Argentine navy pilots had to wait for the BBC bulletin to learn 
what they hit. The news was released at 10:20pm London time, 7:20pm Falklands and 
Argentina time: 
 During the last hours we have heard of further attacks on our ships. One of 
our ships of the Task Force has been badly damaged and early reports are 
that she is in difficulty.  Rescue operations are in progress. I have no 
further details at present.
240
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In fact, the report was only referring to the loss of Coventry. The vagueness of the report 
led the Argentine air force to believe they had hit a major ship, perhaps even one of the 
carriers.
241
  Knowing the Argentines would likely be listening to the BBC, the British 
kept their report deliberately vague as they did not want to fully disclose what had been 
hit and sunk. However, when news of the hit on the Atlantic Conveyor emerged, the 
anxieties of family and next of kin from both ships prompted the British government to 
clarify the very next morning at 11:45AM: 
HMS Coventry, a destroyer, was hit and has been lost. The Atlantic 
Conveyor, a merchant ship requisitioned to support the fleet, was also hit 
and has had to be abandoned. The Harrier reinforcements she was 
carrying for the Task Force had already been disembarked.  Rescue 




When British reporters who entered Port Stanley after the Argentine surrender on 
14 June learned that the Argentine Hercules transports were still using the runway up to 
the last day of the war, British reporters were none too enthused with this discovery.
 243
   
For the British government, this did not matter and there were no attempts to apologize.  
If the raid on the Port Stanley runway had been reported as unsuccessful, combined with 
the controversial sinking of the General Belgrano the very next day on 2 May, the British 
government would have faced severe backlash from anti-war proponents and the 
Opposition, who most likely would have accused the British government of unnecessarily 
escalating the conflict.  In this instance, the British government chose to lie to save face; 
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the real objective of fabrication was to ensure that the overall mission continued.  At the 
time, the lie calmed the “pain in the arse” journalists.  
As it became evident the British were going to take Port Stanley, the government 
decided that the “the best publicity for the UK would be obtained by allowing journalists 
early access, while evidence of the Argentine occupation and fighting was still available 
and while the Task Force’s morale was still at its peak.”
244
 The British government was 
also especially concerned with Latin American and American media interpretations and 
reports following the conclusion of the war.  Subsequently, the British government 
deemed that “it was important that Latin American journalists, who seldom did so, should 
visit the Falkland Islands and obtain the views of the Islanders at first hand. 
245
 The hope 
was that these Latin American journalists would not only portray the British in a positive 
light but also counter Argentine media and propaganda. The British especially wanted 
these journalists to see and report that the Falkland Islanders were ecstatic to see the 
British soldiers and the return to British rule.  Typically very anti-Argentine, some 
Chilean journalists were “robustly pro-British in tone, at times so embarrassingly so as to 
run the risk of being counter-productive.”
246
 The British were relying on the Latin 
American perspective so much that when an exiled Chilean journalist “[lost] no 
opportunity to portray the British in a bad light”, and wrote a “jaundiced” piece on the 
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British campaign, there were immediate attempts to discredit him.
247
 The journalist in 
question, Raul Sohr Jr., was very anti-British and very anti-colonial. Headlines for his 
work included “The Argentine soldiers fought for the Malvinas; the British soldiers 
fought to win this war,” while he claimed that: 
The MoD official (who told me with more than a hint of satisfaction that I 
would need a passport because I would not be leaving British 
territory)…knew that I was going to be the first Latin Americans to visit 
the Malvinas since the British recapture. I could have reminded him that 
the Malvinanses need special permission to enter Great Britain. But no. I 
was not interested in restarting the polemic, only in beginning a journey to 
witness for myself what had happened in the Malvinas. 
 A crew member told me it cost the British government $1,250,000 to bring 
us to the Falklands by DC10 and Hercules…I remembered that the total 
British aid to the Islands between 1976 and 1980 had been $12 million. 
Mr. Hunt [Governor of the Falklands] liked the idea of converting the 
archipelago into a multinational base led by the United States. But he did 
not wish to enter into details.
248
 
He also argued that: 
The ex-Governor, currently Civil Commissioner of the Falklands 
confesses, with certain candor, what London tries to deny: that the 
Malvinas are subjected to a colonial regime. The attitude of the British 
Government is explicable by their fear of stepping on to a slippery slope; 
if they admit that this is a colony they will lend credence to the Argentine 
thesis that the 1,800 inhabitants do not constitute a people but a form part 
of a colonial apparatus.
249
 
The British wanted to maintain good public relations with Latin American countries and 
it did not help that Sr. Sohr was the first Latin American journalist to visit the islands 
after the war. He was well known in Latin America, and his work was published in 
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Chile’s widest read paper La Tercera and in many other Latin American papers.  Despite 
all of the hullabaloo about his articles, however, the efforts to discredit him were weak. 
The British tried to discredit his work by highlighting his exile from Chile and living and 
working situation in Mexico. The British asserted that Sr. Sohr, like other Latin American 
critics, was “politically motivated” and that his “anti-colonialist” stance was dictated by 
Moscow’s allies.
250
 The British also cited his influence from Chilean and Mexican 
socialist parties as reasons for his stance. No other Latin American journalist was given 
as much attention in the British government as Sr. Sohr was. It appears he struck a major 
nerve.  
At the start of the campaign, the former head of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield 
Turner, suggested on television that the British could face defeat.
 251
 It was no secret for 
the British that many high ranking American military officials viewed this war as 
peripheral and irrelevant in the Cold War. While the Americans did not want to see action 
and Soviet influence spread into their backyard, there was still an American sense of 
arrogance towards the conflict.  In September 1982, Admiral Harry Train, then Supreme 
Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) privately told Admiral Woodward, “well there 
are no lessons to be learnt from your little war. Well no new ones anyway.”
252
 Publicly, 
Admiral Train rebuffed the suggestions that the Falklands War demonstrated that surface 
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ships were still unacceptably vulnerable. Instead, he stated that if the British had had 
“proper carriers” from which Airborne Early Warning aircraft (AEW) could operate, 
ships like the HMS Sheffield would not have been lost.
253
  Moreover, he insisted that the 
large carriers, not missing the chance to emphasis the battleships being reactivated by the 
US Navy, were “designed and armored to enable them to remain operational despite 
receiving hits off the front [of the ship] which had sunk British destroyers and frigates in 
the South Atlantic.”
254
 Publicly and privately, the Americans were not enthusiastic about 
the British campaign as they feared too much praise would trigger negative reactions in 
Latin and South America.  The Americans really did not think the Falklands War was that 
big a deal.  
In December 1982, the government acknowledged the tensions between the media 
and government, which were fueled by “the absence on some occasions of sufficiently 
detailed and up to date situation reports from the task force.”
255
   Limitations imposed on 
communication systems, such as radio and electronic surveillance, caused tension 
between military and press personnel. However, they did blame press speculation and 
false Argentine propaganda as reasons why the British had to release information about 
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the operation before family notifications were completed. 
256
 The debate between the 
media and government was never settled during the Falklands War.  The British feared 
press speculation or leaks regarding foreign assistance as they could jeopardize those 
options. They were especially concerned with the Americans backing out, taking with 
them needed intelligence and logistical capabilities. Contingency plans for a British-
Chilean coalition were not implemented; however they were also never fully dismissed. 
The British were again fearful of the speculating press blowing the cover on any potential 
covert operations or worse, isolating Chile from other Latin and South American 
countries.  It was not just the British press that was speculating on future British combat 
action. It was also the Americans, Argentines, Germans and other Europeans who were 
all looking to sell newspapers. Learning from the American military-media debacle in 
Vietnam and with increasing technological capabilities for reporters to send news back 
home, from a military perspective, the British were more than justified in isolating the 
journalists travelling with the Task Force and limiting the details and briefings for the 
journalists in London.  Although the Argentines were able to catch the British off-guard 
with the invasion, the British certainly did not want to lose any chances for foreign 
cooperation or opportunities to gain the upper hand over the Argentine military.  While 
the press continued to speculate and sometimes report sensitive information, the British 
government was able to either counter or use the media to their advantage when need be. 
Even though the press thought they were being oppressed and censored, the British 
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government was able to secure sensitive intelligence, minimize the number of lives lost 


























Since then, Britain, the colonial power, has refused to return the territories to the 
Argentine Republic, thus preventing it from restoring its territorial integrity.
257
 
- Argentina President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. 
 
Britain will always be ready to defend the Falkland Islands.
258
 
- UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
The Falklands War of 1982 did not alter the Cold War environment. In fact, it is often 
referred to as a “little war.”  However, Admiral Sandy Woodward reminds us that “[the] 
only thing ‘little’ about our war was the total number of British servicemen directly 
involved, some twenty-five thousand, and of course, the time span of the fighting, only 
six weeks. But those had days, and occasionally hours, which seemed like eternity itself 
to those who fought there.”
259
 This war was neither irrelevant nor insignificant in the 
grand scheme of world affairs. It will also not be last time conflict arises over the 
Falkland Islands, largely thanks to the recent discovery of oil beds in the South Atlantic. 
In March 2013, the Falklands held a referendum in which 98.8% of the 92% turnout 
voted to remain British.
260
 As expected, the Argentines decried this referendum, 
attributing it to British propaganda.  No one could have predicted Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s determination to recover the islands. The question remains: has she 
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set a precedent for future British governments to respond with military force? Will the 
British always defend the Falklands?  The British went to great lengths to protect their 
colony in 1982, sending a Task Force over 8,000 miles away to the South Atlantic.  Will 
they do it again? 
The documents challenge popular assumptions and interpretations about the war. The 
first interpretation is that British media stoked patriotism back home; while this is correct, 
the documents and other sources demonstrate the lengths the British government had to 
go to control the ever eager media. No doubt frustrated by the lack of information and 
length of travel, British journalists sometimes jeopardized the lives of servicemen in their 
attempts to sell newspapers. A second assumption is that the British and Argentines were 
alone in this war. Again, the documents reveal that British were covertly aided by the 
Americans, they considered asking Chile to join in operations and that they knew the 
Soviets were patrolling the South Atlantic. Lastly, controversy remains whether the 
sinking of the ARA General Belgrano was justified or a war crime. The British 
justifiable feared the Argentine navy. Serious consideration was given to sinking the 
Argentine carrier, 25
th
 of May, as she could seriously crippled or even halt the British 
campaign to recover the islands. Along with the documents, recent admissions by the 
Belgrano’s captain, analysis of the events on 2 May 1982 and breaking down the factors 
which stoked controversy only uphold the British decision to sink the Belgrano.  It is 









































Draft Statement Following Crippling or Sinking of Argentine Aircraft Carrier, 30 April 
1982 
 
1. The United Kingdom is entitled, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-
defense as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to take 
appropriate measures to protect its forces as well as its territory.  
2. The Argentine carrier, the 25th May, when at large in the South Atlantic and 
operating within imminent striking range of our naval units, was  a dangerous 
threat to those units—not only those in the TEZ itself but also to those in our vital 
sea lines of communication on which the Task Force is dependent.  
3. On 23 April we gave a warning to the Argentine Government that any approach 
by Argentine warships or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to 
interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter 
the appropriate response. Subsequently, on 28 April, the Government declared a 
Total Exclusion Zone in the area of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland 
Islands.  
4. The Argentine Government chose to ignore these warnings. On 29 April the 
Argentine Military Junta issued a communique declaring that it would treat as 
hostile all British shipping within 200 miles of the Argentine coast and within a 
200 miles radius of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich 
Islands. Moreover, Argentine naval vessels, including the carrier, have been 
maneuvering at sea for several days.  
5. The range of carrier-borne aircraft and their ability to launch stand-off weapons 
meant that the capacity of this carrier to make an effective strike against our units 
operated over a distance many times greater than in the case of an ordinary vessel. 
In addition, the speed and mobility of the carrier itself meant that it could, if it 
escaped surveillance even for a short period, bring itself within much closer 




circumstances, the operation of the carrier at large in the area in which it was 
encountered in itself constituted a threat to our vessels of the kind against which 
they were warned in our notification of 23 April.  
6. In the face of this threat, and of Argentina’s declared intention to submit British 
forces to attack, the Government’s duty was clear as it was right to act as it did. 
We are entitled and obliged to protect the lives and safety of our officers and men 
on the Task Force, which is there in defense of our rights and our people in the 
Falkland Islands. We are not prepared to tolerate hostile actions by the Argentine 
forces directed against our legitimate response to attempts by the Junta to 
perpetuate its armed aggression against the Falkland Islands while it continues the 
build-up of its forces there in flagrant defiance of Security Council Resolution 
502.  
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Notification to the Argentine Government, 1 May 1982 
 
In announcing a Total Exclusion one around the Falklands on 28April, HMG 
made it clear that these measures are without prejudice to the right of the UK to take 
whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defense, 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In light of the Argentine statement of 30 April of an 
intention to consider hostile British vessels within 200 miles of the Argentine mainland, 
the Falklands and their dependencies, the British government has decided on the 
following measures. The Argentine carrier quote THE 25
TH
 OF MAY unquote is hereby 
warned not to move East of a line 45° West or South of a line 38°  South. If the quote 
25
TH
 OF MAY unquote moves beyond this area she will be regarded as constituting an 
immediate threat to British forces in the South Atlantic and will be liable to be dealt with 
accordingly. Further, if any attack anywhere in the South Atlantic is made upon British 
naval or air forces by an Argentine unit, all other Argentine naval units, including the 
carrier quote THE 25
TH
 OF MAY unquote, even if she is still within the area defined in 
this communication, and all Argentine military operation at sea in the South Atlantic or in 
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